THE NASUWT SUBMISSION
TO THE SCHOOL TEACHERS’ REVIEW BODY
4 MARCH 2022

The NASUWT – The Teachers’ Union.

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1. **INTRODUCTION**

“I think it is disgusting that, as qualified professionals, we have had, in real terms, a year-on-year pay cut since 2007. I could now earn more money working full time in a supermarket than as a teacher. Many teachers I know are having to take on extra jobs at the weekend and on an evening just to make ends meet. We face an even bigger crisis in teaching recruitment and retention if pay does not increase in line with other professions that require postgraduate qualifications” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

1.1 The last two years have been the most difficult and stressful for the teaching profession in living memory. As key workers during the coronavirus pandemic, teachers have paid with their health, and sometimes with their lives, as part of a national mission to deliver education during the most difficult of circumstances. The stress on the teaching profession has been immense and, in addition, teachers and their families are having to manage a cost of living crisis against the background of a pay freeze.

1.2 The School Teachers’ Review Body’s (STRB’s) 32nd Report is a crucial report in a whole number of ways. It is crucial for individual teachers and for the teaching profession as a whole, of course, but it is also crucial for the reputation of the Review Body, indeed for the integrity of the independent pay review body process.

1.3 The Review Body has shown itself capable of comprehensive and independent analysis of Government policy towards the teacher workforce. This was particularly set out in the Review Body’s 30th Report, which came at such a crucial period for schools and for wider society because of the coronavirus pandemic. The Review Body’s analysis of the teacher supply issues, together with many of the conclusions drawn in its 30th Report, remains vital to the future, not just because it focuses on the teacher workforce, but also because it details the recovery strategy for a generation of children and young people that have been severely affected by the pandemic.

1.4 In its 30th Report, the Review Body succinctly captured the centrality of teachers to an effective education system, and stated that pay should reward and incentivise teachers during their careers:

‘An effective education system relies on schools across the country being able to recruit and retain enough high-quality teachers. The teacher pay system must attract both good graduates and career changers to join the teaching profession, support and retain classroom teachers as they develop expertise and gain experience, and support and incentivise those who wish to progress into middle and senior leadership roles. To achieve this, it is important that earnings for teachers are competitive with the graduate labour market at the point of entry to the profession. Furthermore, as they become more experienced, teachers’ earnings should remain competitive with those with similar levels of experience in comparable graduate professions. Within the pay system, there should be clarity for teachers on how their careers can be expected to progress and their potential earnings, up to and including moving into leadership positions.’

1.5 The Review Body accepted the NASUWT’s evidence while identifying that the current pay system does not deliver a sufficient supply of teachers and that long-term trends confirm there are severe and persistent problems with teacher supply.\(^2\)

1.6 In its 30th Report, the Review Body further commented: ‘While the deterioration in retention rates is most marked for teachers early in their career, we are concerned that there are also indications of a growing challenge in retaining experienced classroom teachers and those in leadership roles.’

1.7 One of the most important conclusions reached by the Review Body in its 30th Report was the recognition that experienced teachers are influential mentors and role models for teachers starting out in the profession, and that a failure to retain experienced teachers makes it far less likely that schools will also retain newer entrants to the profession.

1.8 In its 31st Report, the Review Body acknowledged, and quoted from, the NASUWT’s evidence to it, which made clear that there will be overwhelming anger across the teaching profession that, following the most difficult year which the profession has ever known, teachers are to receive no pay award. The Review Body quoted the NASUWT’s evidence that many teachers have paid with their health, and some with their lives, for their dedication as key workers to the nation’s children and young people during the coronavirus pandemic.

1.9 Nonetheless, in its 31st Report, the Review Body complied with the direction from the Government to implement the teachers’ pay freeze other than to give a £250 pay award to the lowest paid unqualified teachers, meaning that only 1.4% of teachers received a pay award at the most meagre level.

1.10 The Review Body’s 30th and 31st Reports failed to follow the logic of their own analysis by delivering a below-inflation pay award and a pay freeze for the overwhelming majority of teachers.

1.11 The NASUWT carried out a survey of members following the Secretary of State’s Ministerial Statement announcing the pay freeze on 21 July 2021, which confirmed the anger of teachers and the harm which the pay freeze has caused to the profession:

- 92% of teachers opposed the pay freeze, with 30% indicating that they disagreed with it and an additional 62% indicating that they were angry with it;
- 87% of teachers indicated that the pay freeze will have a negative impact on their morale as a teacher;
- 90% of teachers did not believe that the pay freeze was fair, given the current circumstances of the country;
- 49% of teachers indicated that the pay freeze makes it less likely that they will remain as a teacher;
- 83% of teachers indicated that the pay freeze will have a negative impact on the recruitment and retention of teachers in their school; and
- 43% of teachers indicated that the pay freeze will make it more likely that they will apply for jobs outside of teaching, with an additional 28%"
indicating that the pay freeze will make it much more likely that they will apply for jobs outside of teaching.

1.12 The NASUWT carried out a survey of members in January/February 2022 and asked members their views about the pay freeze. Ninety-eight per cent of members disagreed with the decision.

1.13 The NASUWT must emphasise to the Review Body that the anger regarding the Government’s contempt of teachers is now in serious danger of being directed against the Review Body itself. The Union stresses to the Review Body that, unless it genuinely asserts and demonstrates its independence from the Government, this will call into question the STRB process which was established in the 1980s as an alternative to national collective bargaining over teachers’ pay.

1.14 The Review Body’s decision to comply with Government policy has exacerbated the pay gap between teachers in England and those in Wales and Scotland, to which the NASUWT had already drawn attention in its evidence for the Review Body’s 31st Report. The reality is that, in recent years, teachers in Scotland and Wales have been better served by their pay-bargaining machinery than those teachers in England who are covered by the STRB. In the same way, teachers in the sixth-form college sector, who are not covered by the STRB, have received a pay award in 2021/22.

1.15 As in previous years, the NASUWT has commissioned research from Incomes Data Research (IDR) into the pay of comparable graduate professionals, which it now presents to the Review Body. IDR begins its report as follows:

‘This report is the latest in a long line of similar studies produced for the NASUWT, but this year is the first to be published against a backdrop of historically high inflation levels. In fact, inflation did not feature a great deal in our previous research because levels have been low for some time but according to the latest available statistics as of December 2021, the UK Consumer Prices Index (CPI) stood at 5.4% while the Retail Prices Index (RPI) was even higher at 7.5%. The last time levels of this magnitude were experienced was over 30 years ago.’

1.16 IDR goes on to comment:

‘As we emerge out of a pandemic in which school teachers have played an important role, the current acceleration in prices will present something of a challenge for the STRB, alongside the other issues under consideration.’

1.17 IDR also comments that the Review Body identified the extent of the uncompetitive nature of teachers’ salaries in its 31st Report:

‘While pay for most teachers in England did not change at the last review, many of the other factors affecting the profession continue to be influenced by the pandemic and its associated impacts on the economy and labour market. Issues such as pay progression, recruitment, retention and pay relativities

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3 Incomes Data Research, A Review of school teachers’ pay in England compared with other graduate professions, February 22, 1.1, Annex 1.
with other occupations remain important and much of the recent STRB report was focused on these issues. For example, an analysis of pay levels by age by the STRB showed that, with the exception of those over 60, teachers’ median earnings were below those of other professional occupations in each age band, both in London and the rest of England. Moreover, across all age categories, the relative earnings of teachers have deteriorated over the period from 2012/13, with teachers in the youngest age group (21-30) comparing least favourably.1

1.18 Conducting an expert analysis of the crisis in the teaching profession is not enough for teachers. If the Review Body does not begin to make recommendations which flow from that analysis, it will call into question whether teachers have a pay review process which can claim to be independent or effective.

1.19 The NASUWT has always been a stalwart champion of the Review Body and a supporter of the independent pay review body process for determining teachers’ pay and conditions. However, the teaching profession is now beginning to question whether the Review Body is independent or whether, indeed, it is a Government department.

“Teaching is in CRISIS. We must be paid a fair salary for the job we do. We are disillusioned when we see our peers not stressed under excessive workloads and earning more. Yes, the starting salary should be raised to attract graduates but you cannot fill schools with newly qualified teachers. Those who have stayed and endured the erosion of pay, being undervalued and made scapegoats need recognition and a salary that reflects our experience. We have so much to offer the next generation of students and those new to the profession, yet we are ignored. Not all seek TLRs [Teaching and Learning Responsibilities] but have dedicated ourselves to being excellent classroom practitioners and role models.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

4 Ibid.
2. THE POSITION ON TEACHERS’ PAY

The cost of living crisis

“I am currently M6 and have been for about six years. I do leadership of history, RE and PE as we are a small school and do not get paid any extra for these responsibilities. I have been told, as we are a small school and two staff members are on the upper pay scale, that I would not be able to go up. With living costs rising over the years, it is just undoable with bills, mortgage and childcare.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, February 2022.

2.1 Inflation is at its highest for nearly 30 years\(^5\) and CPI inflation is currently running at 5.5%.\(^6\) The Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported RPI inflation of 7.8% in January 2022. Teachers in England received no pay award last year and all teachers are in the throes of a cost of living crisis. Inflation is forecast to increase further during the first half of 2022, which itself exerts pressure on the Bank of England to raise interest rates, increasing the cost of housing for teachers alongside increases to the cost of goods and services.

2.2 Base interest rates rose to 0.5% in February 2021 and are forecast to rise again — possibly two or three times — this year.

2.3 The lifting of the energy bill price cap has delivered a whopping 54% rise to household energy bills. The price cap is set for review again in October and could mean further increases across the board.

2.4 National Insurance Contributions are to be increased by 1.25% in April.

2.5 By September 2021, teachers’ real terms pay had been cut by around 17% on average since 2010.

2.6 For supply teachers, the impact of pay freezes and real terms pay cuts, together with the lack of effective regulation of agencies, has resulted in even more acute cost of living pressures and the exodus of many supply teachers from the profession, including to non-professional occupations, such as retailing, where pay levels are rising.

2.7 The NASUWT reminds the Review Body that in the 2019 Queen’s Speech to Parliament, the Government promised that: ‘It is vital we ensure that the pay offer for teachers is positioned at the top of the graduate labour market – ensuring we recruit and retain a world class profession – and that is why we have announced plans to significantly raise starting pay to £30,000 nationally by September 2022.’ Teachers expect this promise to be delivered in September 2022, together with measures to raise salaries for all teachers to prevent the retention crisis deepening.

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The real-terms cut in teachers’ pay

“My main worry is that pay is not increasing with cost of living. I earn a good wage but still find myself questioning if we can manage without heating tonight, despite working 70-hour weeks and making myself ill through exhaustion. There has been no acknowledgement of the tough times education is in, with no let-up on academic expectation despite COVID hitting our schools massively over and over again. It is relentless.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, February 2022.

2.8 The ONS publishes inflation statistics using a variety of inflation indices. Out of a range of inflation indices, Review Bodies are obliged to select the one which is most appropriate to their workforce. Out of the ONS’s inflation indices, the NASUWT asks the Review Body to have regard to the Retail Prices Index (RPI) when considering the impact of inflation on teachers.

2.9 The Government switches between different inflation indices for different purposes. For example, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) measure is the Government’s preferred inflation measure for the purposes of public sector pay and both public and state pension increases. However, rail fares, for example, increase every year by an RPI inflation measure and the ONS also publishes inflation data using the CPI (H) index.

2.10 On 17 January 2019, the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee Inquiry published a report into the use of RPI.7 The Committee raised concerns that over recent years, the Government has intentionally side-lined RPI in favour of methods that show lower headline inflation. The Committee cited concerns with rail fares and student loan interest rates increasing by RPI, whilst public expenditure is uprated by the lower CPI rate.

2.11 For teachers early in their careers, student loan repayments are a significant item of expenditure, and interest on these increases by RPI, not CPI.

2.12 IDR indicates that two thirds of employers use the RPI inflation index when calculating pay awards for their workforces because the range of prices, which are included in the index, makes this a much more reliable indicator of the increases in prices which impact on their workforce. This also makes the RPI index the one which is most directly relevant to teachers, although for other social or even occupational groups, an alternative inflation index may be more relevant. The NASUWT asks the Review Body to accept that RPI is a more accurate inflation measure for teachers than the CPI.

2.13 The ONS reports a 12-month RPI inflation figure for January 2022 of 7.8%.8 Using the January 2022 ONS RPI index, the price of gas has risen by 28.8% over 12 months and the price of fuel and light has risen by 23.2% over 12 months. The cost of petrol and oil has risen by 23.9% over 12 months. The cost of clothing and footwear has risen by 14% over 12 months and the cost of processed vegetables has risen by 11.8% over 12 months. The cost of consumer durables has risen by 11.9% over 12 months and the cost of travel and leisure has risen by 10.7% over 12 months.

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2.14 Teachers do not typically tend to live in the catchment areas for their schools and increases in travel costs, particularly the cost of petrol, tend to impact significantly on their cost of living.

2.15 Inflation is forecast to remain at the highest level for decades through the Winter and Spring this year and to still be over 5.0% (RPI) by September 2022.⁹

2.16 The impact of the increase in National Insurance Contributions of 1.25% in April 2022 needs to be added to this picture of record increases in the price of goods and services up to the date of the National Insurance Contribution increase. The Review Body should not underestimate the psychological impact of the cut in take-home pay which teachers in England will sustain in April 2022. This will mean that most teachers’ pay packets from April 2022 onwards are lower than their September 2020 pay packets, despite the enormous increase in the cost of living since then. Whilst many working people will see their take-home pay fall in April 2022, they will not have had to sustain this against the background of no pay increase for nearly two years. This includes teachers in Wales and Scotland, as these workforces have received pay awards in 2021/22.

2.17 The significance of the extent to which teachers’ pay has fallen in real terms during 2021/22 is that it adds to the drastic real terms fall in teachers’ pay which has occurred since 2010.

**The real terms cut in teachers’ pay**

2.18 The chart below shows the extent to which the pay of teachers on the Main Pay Range (MPR) has fallen behind price increases, measured by both the RPI and CPI, since 2010. The chart illustrates pay increases in the best-case scenario, where a teacher on the MPR has received the maximum pay award each year since 2010 (Max Main Pay Range) and the worst-case scenario, where a teacher on the MPR has received no cost of living award since 2014.

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⁹ Incomes Data Research (IDR) Pay Climate, December 2021.
2.19 In both the best- and worst-case scenarios, teachers’ pay has failed to keep pace with price increases as measured by both the RPI and CPI inflation measures. Teachers in 2020 are significantly poorer in real terms than they were in 2010. The Government’s pay freeze, implemented in 2021, could not have come at a worse time for hard-working teachers, since RPI inflation rocketed to a high of 7.5% in December 2021, its highest rate in over 30 years.

2.20 The following chart illustrates the percentage increase in MPR pay in both the best- and worst-case pay scenarios since 2010, as set out above, together with the 12-month percentage change in inflation for both RPI and CPI in September of each year.
2.21 Any marginal real terms gains made in 2015, 2018, 2019 and 2020 have had little impact on the cumulative shortfall in teachers’ salaries that depressed teachers’ real terms earnings since 2010. The pay freeze in 2021, coupled with crippling cost of living increases, has plunged many teachers into real financial hardship.

**Cumulative shortfall in teachers’ salaries in 2020/21**

2.22 The table below shows the extent to which teachers’ salaries have reduced in real terms, as measured by RPI, since 2010. The values of teachers’ pay on the MPR are between £3,879 (15.1%) and £6,290 (17%) lower in 2021/22 than if teachers’ salaries had increased to keep pace with RPI inflation since 2010.

2.23 Similarly, the salaries of Upper Pay Range (UPR) teachers are between £8,165 (21.1%) and £8,781 (21.1%) lower in 2021/22 than if teachers’ salaries had increased to keep pace with RPI inflation since 2010. Leadership Pay Range (LPR) headteachers’ salaries are between £10,358 (21.7%) and £26,869 (22.9%) lower by the same measure.

2.24 The Conservative Government’s policy to freeze teachers’ pay in 2011, 2012 and 2021, apply a 1% pay cap from 2013 to 2016, and impose successive below-RPI inflation pay increases in eight out of 12 years in government, has devastated teachers’ salary levels and their finances. The table below also shows the cumulative impact on teachers’ pay range values since 2010, as a result of successive and prolonged below-RPI inflation salary increases. Teachers and school leaders who have remained in the profession since 2010
are in effect between £30,480 and £177,802 worse off in real terms since 2010, due to the cumulative shortfall in pay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England</th>
<th>Salary 2021/22 (Pay Freeze)</th>
<th>Shortfall in 2021/22 (£)</th>
<th>% shortfall in 2021/22</th>
<th>2010/11-2021/22 Cumulative shortfall (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>£25,714</td>
<td>-£3,879</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>-£30,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>£27,600</td>
<td>-£4,332</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>-£33,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>£29,664</td>
<td>-£4,836</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>-£36,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>£31,778</td>
<td>-£5,376</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>-£39,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>£34,100</td>
<td>-£5,982</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-£42,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>£36,961</td>
<td>-£6,290</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>-£44,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS1</td>
<td>£38,690</td>
<td>-£8,165</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-£54,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS2</td>
<td>£40,124</td>
<td>-£8,466</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-£56,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS3</td>
<td>£41,604</td>
<td>-£8,781</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-£58,627</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L6</td>
<td>£47,735</td>
<td>-£10,358</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-£68,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L8</td>
<td>£50,151</td>
<td>-£10,883</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-£71,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L11</td>
<td>£54,091</td>
<td>-£11,740</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-£77,647</td>
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<tr>
<td>L28</td>
<td>£81,942</td>
<td>-£17,785</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-£117,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L43</td>
<td>£117,197</td>
<td>-£26,869</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>-£177,802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.25 A significant above-RPI inflation increase in salary values over a sustained period is necessary to restore teachers’ salaries to a level commensurate to their skills and experience. If austerity is truly over, and the Government is serious about putting the Education Sector at the heart of their Levelling Up agenda, then rebuilding and investing in the teaching profession must be prioritised to ensure there are enough qualified teachers to teach in schools.

2.26 The NASUWT notes the Government’s previously announced intention to increase classroom teachers’ starting salaries to £30,000 nationally by September 2022. This policy was withdrawn by the Government in favour of a 2021/22 pay freeze. However, whilst a £30,000 starting salary in 2022 would have been a welcome step in the right direction if implemented, it would have failed to cover the projected salary shortfall in 2022 if teachers’ salaries had increased in line with RPI inflation since 2010.

2.27 The £30,000 starting salary has been presented by the Government as a significant improvement to teachers’ pay. However, this is not the case. If teachers’ starting salaries had increased in line with RPI inflation since 2010, and continued to rise in line with RPI inflation in 2022, as forecast by HM Treasury, then those starting salaries would increase to £30,658 in September 2022 in any case. A £30k teachers’ starting salary only takes starting salaries back to where they should be if the teaching profession had not endured 12 years’ worth of pay cuts.
2.28 The reality is that to restore teachers’ starting salaries to the same level as 2010 in real terms by September 2022, increases from 19.225% onwards will be necessary.

2.29 The following table models the teachers’ salary scales up to and including 2022-2023, incorporating the level of increase to all salary values that would be necessary to achieve the salary level that would have been realised if teachers’ salaries had kept pace with RPI inflation since 2010 (RPI increase).

Salary increases necessary to restore teachers’ pay to 2010 levels in real terms (RPI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spine Point</th>
<th>Main pay range</th>
<th>Upper pay range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£pa</td>
<td>£pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M1 (Minimum)</strong></td>
<td>£25,714</td>
<td>£25,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£27,600</td>
<td>£27,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M3</strong></td>
<td>£29,664</td>
<td>£29,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M4</strong></td>
<td>£31,778</td>
<td>£31,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M5</strong></td>
<td>£34,100</td>
<td>£34,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M6 (Maximum)</strong></td>
<td>£36,961</td>
<td>£36,961</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>U1 (Minimum)</strong></td>
<td>£38,690</td>
<td>£38,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U2</strong></td>
<td>£40,124</td>
<td>£40,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U3 (Maximum)</strong></td>
<td>£41,604</td>
<td>£41,604</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Additional pension contributions

2.30 Teachers’ take-home pay has been significantly reduced due to paying increased pension contributions since 2012. The table below details the amount of additional pension contributions that teachers will pay in 2021/22 and cumulatively from 2012/13 to 2021/22, over and above the original 6.4% contribution rate as a result of the increased pension contribution rates introduced in 2012.
### Additional pension contributions (over 6.4%) paid between 2012/13 - 2021/22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total increase in pension contributions</th>
<th>Salary at 1 September 2021 (Pay Freeze)</th>
<th>% Increase (over 6.4% rate)</th>
<th>Additional Pension Contributions (over 6.4%) paid in 2021/22</th>
<th>Additional Pension Contributions (over 6.4%) paid between 2012/13-2021/22</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£pa with tax relief</td>
<td>£ with tax relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Pay Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>£25,714</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>257.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>M2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>699.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>£34,100</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>750.20</td>
<td>6,221.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>£36,961</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>813.14</td>
<td>7,143.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Pay Range</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS1</td>
<td>£38,690</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,238.08</td>
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<td>UPS2</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,283.97</td>
<td>10,980.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS3</td>
<td>£41,604</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,331.33</td>
<td>11,385.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Pay Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L6</td>
<td>£47,735</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,813.93</td>
<td>15,528.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L8</td>
<td>£50,151</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,905.74</td>
<td>16,814.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L11</td>
<td>£54,091</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2,055.46</td>
<td>18,572.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L28</td>
<td>£81,942</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4,342.93</td>
<td>35,103.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L43</td>
<td>£117,197</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6,211.44</td>
<td>55,198.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following table shows the combined cumulative loss to teachers’ pay as a consequence of both the real terms shortfall in teachers’ salaries, resulting from below-RPI salary increases since 2010, and increased pension contributions over 6.4% since 2012. Teachers who have remained in the profession since 2010/11 are between £32,166 and £210,921 worse off in 2021/22 as a result of the combined impact of increases to teachers' pension contributions and successive governments imposing substantial real terms pay cuts on teachers.
### ‘Combined Cumulative Loss’ between 2010/11 - 2020/21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England</th>
<th>Salary 2021/22 (Pay Freeze)</th>
<th>Shortfall in salary 2021/22 as a result of below-RPI pay increases</th>
<th>Additional Pension Contributions (over 6.4%) paid in 2021/22</th>
<th>‘Combined Loss’ in 2021/22</th>
<th>Total additional Pension Contributions (over 6.4%) paid between 2012/13-2021/22</th>
<th>Cumulative shortfall in salary between 2010/11 - 2021/22 as a result of below-PI pay increases</th>
<th>‘Combined Cumulative Loss’ between 2010/11 - 2021/22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£pa with tax relief</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£ with tax relief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>£25,714</td>
<td>-£3,879</td>
<td>-£206</td>
<td>-£4,084</td>
<td>-£1,686</td>
<td>-£30,480</td>
<td>-£32,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>£27,600</td>
<td>-£4,332</td>
<td>-£221</td>
<td>-£4,553</td>
<td>-£1,817</td>
<td>-£33,191</td>
<td>-£35,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>£31,778</td>
<td>-£5,376</td>
<td>-£559</td>
<td>-£5,935</td>
<td>-£4,620</td>
<td>-£39,284</td>
<td>-£43,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>£34,100</td>
<td>-£5,982</td>
<td>-£600</td>
<td>-£6,582</td>
<td>-£4,977</td>
<td>-£42,746</td>
<td>-£47,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>£36,691</td>
<td>-£6,290</td>
<td>-£651</td>
<td>-£6,941</td>
<td>-£5,715</td>
<td>-£44,129</td>
<td>-£49,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS1</td>
<td>£38,690</td>
<td>-£8,165</td>
<td>-£990</td>
<td>-£9,155</td>
<td>-£8,471</td>
<td>-£54,517</td>
<td>-£62,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS2</td>
<td>£40,124</td>
<td>-£8,466</td>
<td>-£1,027</td>
<td>-£9,493</td>
<td>-£8,785</td>
<td>-£56,530</td>
<td>-£65,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS3</td>
<td>£41,604</td>
<td>-£8,781</td>
<td>-£1,065</td>
<td>-£9,846</td>
<td>-£9,109</td>
<td>-£58,627</td>
<td>-£67,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Pay Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L6</td>
<td>£47,735</td>
<td>-£10,358</td>
<td>-£1,451</td>
<td>-£11,809</td>
<td>-£11,078</td>
<td>-£68,511</td>
<td>-£79,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L8</td>
<td>£50,151</td>
<td>-£10,883</td>
<td>-£1,525</td>
<td>-£12,408</td>
<td>-£10,841</td>
<td>-£71,987</td>
<td>-£82,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L11</td>
<td>£54,091</td>
<td>-£11,740</td>
<td>-£1,233</td>
<td>-£12,973</td>
<td>-£11,143</td>
<td>-£77,647</td>
<td>-£88,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L28</td>
<td>£81,942</td>
<td>-£17,785</td>
<td>-£2,606</td>
<td>-£20,391</td>
<td>-£21,062</td>
<td>-£117,639</td>
<td>-£138,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L43</td>
<td>£117,197</td>
<td>-£26,869</td>
<td>-£3,727</td>
<td>-£30,595</td>
<td>-£33,119</td>
<td>-£177,802</td>
<td>-£210,921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.32 The table above shows that the combined cumulative loss to teachers’ pay, as a consequence of both the real terms shortfall in teachers’ salaries and increased pension contributions, now amounts to more than a full year’s salary being docked from teachers’ pay packets by successive governments since 2010.

“More than a decade of pay freezes and below-inflation pay rises mean we are now miles behind where we should be. We should see a really significant single pay rise and then guaranteed pay rises that keep track of real inflation. I am tired that public sector workers, and teachers in particular, carry the can for the country’s poor finances. I suggest all public sector pay rises should match MP pay rises - if they need them, then so do we.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, February 2022.
2.33 Research carried out by the NASUWT in 2020, the year before the pay freeze, confirms how uncompetitive teachers find their salaries to be:10
1. 80% of teachers believe that their salaries are not currently competitive with other occupations in terms of the salaries and rewards on offer;
2. 69% of teachers feel that they are not paid at a level which is appropriate for their skills and level of experience as a teacher; and
3. 69% of teachers feel that individuals are put off a career in teaching because of their pay.

2.34 It is a myth that teachers’ pay levels do not impact on the retention of teachers in the profession. The NASUWT’s 2022 teachers’ pay survey indicates that 70% of teachers have considered leaving their job in the last 12 months and 49% of teachers indicated that their pay had a great deal or a lot of impact on their intention to leave the profession.

2.35 The NASUWT’s 2022 teachers’ pay survey reveals the following about teachers during 2021:
- 54% cut back their expenditure on food;
- 68% cut back their expenditure on clothing;
- 40% cut back expenditure on essential household items; and
- 12% had to take a second job.

2.36 Disturbingly, teachers reported having to use food banks and to seek other forms of charitable assistance.

2.37 Unsurprisingly, the NASUWT’s survey shows that two thirds of teachers (66%) are ‘somewhat worried’ about their financial situation, whereas 22% are ‘very worried’.

2.38 The NASUWT’s Benevolent Fund continued to provide financial assistance at a time of high levels of teacher hardship during 2021.

2.39 A total of £177,851.37 was paid out from the Union’s Central Benevolent Fund in the form of grants to applicants. Of this total:
- £100,014 was for single-payment grants to applicants who were facing financial hardship for a whole variety of reasons;
- £29,800 was for convalescence grants to aid applicants during a time of physical or emotional illness; and
- £8,187 was for grants for rent and mortgage payments.

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10 Big Question 2020, Annex 7.
2.40 The Education Support charity awarded 342 grants during 2021.

“In terms of pay, I have been a teacher for 22 years and [now] cannot afford to live to the extent that I had to visit food banks over the Christmas period. I am now on Upper Pay Scale 3 and unfortunately cannot progress any further. I cannot even afford to pay into my pension. I question if this job is worth it when plumbers etc are paid more money. I am a single parent now — and after 22 years in the profession, giving my heart and soul to help children progress, I feel worthless. The contradiction here is: if I cannot afford to pay my bills, feed my children etc, the bailiffs would be banging on the door. What do I say? ‘I am a professional?’” — Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, February 2022.

Teachers’ pay compared with pay awards across the wider economy

2.41 The NASUWT has commissioned research from IDR which has compared teachers’ pay awards with those across the whole economy. A minus variation indicates higher pay settlements across the median of the wider economy:

Table 4b: English school teachers’ pay awards compared with those in the wider economy, 2007 to 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School teachers in England</th>
<th>Pay settlements – whole economy (WE)</th>
<th>Variation teachers’ rise &amp; median (WE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% general award</td>
<td>Lower quartile %</td>
<td>Median %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Salary award of 2.5%</td>
<td>Q3 3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 General salary award of 2.45%</td>
<td>Q3 3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 General salary award of 2.3%</td>
<td>Q3 0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 General salary award of 2.3%</td>
<td>Q3 0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 No general salary award</td>
<td>Q3 0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 No general salary award</td>
<td>Q3 1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 General salary award of 1%</td>
<td>Q3 1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 1% award in range minima, maxima and reference points.</td>
<td>Q3 2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 1% award to the minima of all pay ranges and allowances, 2% award to the maxima of the main range.</td>
<td>Q3 1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 1% award to the statutory minima and maxima of all pay ranges and allowances in the national pay framework from September 2016, including allowances. Schools have discretion over how to apply the award unless teacher is on the minimum pay-point.</td>
<td>Q3 1.0</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 2% award to the minimum and maximum of the main pay range; a 1% uplift to the minima and maxima of the upper pay range, the unqualified teacher pay range and the leading practitioner pay range. Schools have discretion over how to apply the award unless teacher is on the minimum pay point, but they must be within the overall 1% public sector pay cap.</td>
<td>Q3 1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 IDR, A review of school teachers’ pay in England compared with other graduate professions, February 2022, 3.
School teachers in England | Pay settlements – whole economy | Variation 
teachers’ rise & median 
(WE) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% general award</th>
<th>Lower quartile %</th>
<th>Median quartile %</th>
<th>Upper quartile %</th>
<th>% point difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018 3.5% award to the minimum and maximum of the unqualified pay range and main pay range; 2% to the minimum and maximum of the upper pay range, leading practitioner pay range and all allowances; 1.5% to the min and max of the leadership pay ranges.</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 2.75% award to the main and upper pay ranges and a 5% award in the starting rate for newly qualified teachers.</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 2.75% award with 5.5% on min of the main pay range.</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Pay freeze for most, excluding circa 6,000 staff (mainly unqualified teachers) whose full-time equivalent basic earnings are less than £24,000 (nationally, with higher limits for London and fringe) who received a consolidated award of £250.</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>1.7*</td>
<td>2.0*</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Provisional and subject to revision.

Source: IDR

2.42 As IDR has concluded: ‘What the analysis shows is that the teaching profession in England has tended to receive lower pay awards than those for other groups, apart from during the depths of the recession in 2009 and 2010 and in the most recent two years.’

2.43 As the economy recovers from the pandemic, there is increased demand for skilled and graduate workers, with the risk of the teaching profession falling further behind. KPMG and the REC jointly commented recently that demand for skilled personnel has driven starting salaries to their highest level of increase since 1997, with pay for newly qualified lawyers increasing by up to 50%.

2.44 The Evening Standard reports a record of 1,247,000 job vacancies in the three months to December, an increase of 462,000 from pre-pandemic levels, which was confirmed by the latest figures from the ONS.12

2.45 The NASUWT will expand on these issues in the section of this evidence on wider economy and labour market matters. However, the key point for the Review Body here is that the crisis caused by the fall in teachers’ real terms pay levels since 2010 will be compounded by the factors associated with the opening up of the economy following the ending of the coronavirus pandemic.

“If they do not increase pay substantially, then, like lorry driving, we are heading towards a perfect storm of not enough teaching staff. Look after your biggest asset and stop treating school staff and our profession as a second class job and as if it is not a valued profession. We can leave, and we will leave. After all, we all need to live.” Teacher, England pay survey, 2022.

12 London starting salaries rising at fastest rate on record | Evening Standard
Teachers’ Pay across the UK

2.45 Teachers in England are the poor relations to the rest of the teaching profession in the UK – with no pay award or prospect of a pay award in 2021/22 and with pay levels and access to pay progression worse than in any other part of the UK.

2.46 The teachers’ starting salary in Wales is already higher than the teachers’ starting salary in England, at £27,491 in Wales and £25,714 in England (excluding London). The maximum of the Wales MPR (on which there is automatic, incremental pay progression) is £37,974, whereas in England (excluding London) the maximum of the MPR is £36,961.

2.47 This compares with the maximum of the MPR in England (excluding London) of £36,961.

2.48 Moreover, in Scotland, the teachers’ starting salary (as of 1 April 2020) is £27,498, increasing to £41,412 after five years’ service. The 2021/22 pay award is pending in Scotland, with a cost envelope identified by the employers of 1.22%. Following the implementation of this award, from 1 April 2021, teachers’ pay in England will be even more uncompetitive compared with that of Scotland.

2.49 In both Scotland and Wales, teachers enjoy national statutory pay scales which have, in effect, been shortened to five points going forwards. In both nations, teachers also benefit from annual time-served pay progression, giving them certainty of reaching the maximum of their pay scale. The NASUWT stresses that, in Scotland, this gives teachers certainty of pay progression to £41,412 after five years’ service.

2.50 IDR research commissioned by the NASUWT indicates the uncompetitive level of teachers’ salaries in England. Relative to average pay for non-teaching professions, the gap between teachers and other non-teaching occupations in England (86.7% secondary; 81.2% primary), is considerably wider than for teachers in both Wales (99.4% secondary; 93.6% primary) and Scotland (89.3% secondary; 84.7% primary). In other words, teaching in pay terms is lagging further behind comparator occupations to a greater extent in England than in other parts of the UK.

2.51 IDR has demonstrated the significantly better salaries for teachers in Scotland by identifying the variance between teachers’ salaries in England and Scotland. The percentage variances shown in the following table are the difference expressed as a percentage of the relevant salary in Scotland, since in this case the latter is the comparator. A minus variance indicates that salaries are higher in Scotland than in England.
### Table 6: Comparison of teacher salaries, England versus Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England £pa</th>
<th>Scotland £pa*</th>
<th>£pa variance</th>
<th>% variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>25,714</td>
<td>32,994</td>
<td>-7,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>34,863</td>
<td>-7,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>29,664</td>
<td>36,891</td>
<td>-7,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>31,778</td>
<td>39,231</td>
<td>-7,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>41,412</td>
<td>-7,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>39,961</td>
<td>(41,412)</td>
<td>(-1,451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U1</td>
<td>38,690</td>
<td>(41,412)</td>
<td>(-2,722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>40,124</td>
<td>(41,412)</td>
<td>(-1,288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U3</td>
<td>41,604</td>
<td>(41,412)</td>
<td>(+192)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.52 The teachers’ pay framework in England is even less favourable than this data table suggests, given that in Scotland progression up a shorter classroom teacher pay scale to the equivalent of UPS3 is time served (annual) and automatic, whereas in England any pay progression is dependent on the vagaries of the pay progression process.

2.53 IDR’s research shows that, in Wales, most pay points are 1.7% higher than in England.

"With National Insurance increasing by 1.25%, energy prices surging, inflation approaching 6% and years of below-inflation pay awards/pay freezes, incomes are declining significantly. A significant pay rise is therefore needed for all teachers just to start catching up with lost income. From April, I have calculated my income will decline by £100 per month because of the changes mentioned above.” - Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

### Supply teachers

2.54 The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the undersupply of teachers in England, as staffing shortages during the Omicron wave of COVID have led to widespread school closures, both partial and full. The reality is that, in England, supply teaching is a deeply precarious and unattractive option.

2.55 The average daily pay rate for a classroom teacher employed by a school is £207.88. However, the majority of supply teachers report that they are paid between £100 and £149 per day. The majority of supply teachers have not seen their remuneration increase substantially since 2014.

2.56 The Union believes that it is now time for the entitlement to national pay scales to be returned to teachers, including those undertaking supply, in England. This would ensure that schools in England have a competitive salary structure.

2.57 Indeed, in regards to rates of pay for the overwhelming majority of supply teachers forced to undertake work through supply agencies and/or umbrella companies, it still remains the case that two fifths of supply teachers (41%) stated that they were aware of assignments being offered or paid at between £51 and £119 per day from September 2020. Well over two fifths (45%) reported assignments being offered or paid at between £120 and £149 per day, and just over one in ten respondents (11%) reported assignments being
offered or paid at between £151 and £199 a day. One per cent said that they were aware of assignments being offered or paid at £50 or less per day.

2.58 This demonstrates that the increased reliance on agency working has led to a reduction in the pay and conditions of service of supply teachers. Rates of pay of supply teachers have remained stagnant for the overwhelming majority of supply teachers, and have been eroded by inflation.

2.59 Across England by September 2021, teachers had suffered up to 17% real terms cuts in pay since 2010. However, in comparison, without the application of the national pay framework, supply teachers have seen their pay plummet relative to other teachers, with no national entitlement to an annual pay award when employed via supply agencies.

2.60 If employed for all 195 days of the academic year, just over two fifths of supply teachers (41%) could expect to earn a salary less than or equivalent to £9,945 to £23,205 per academic year. Such rates of pay would currently see a supply teacher earn over £15,769 to £2,509 below the minimum advisory pay spine (M1), as detailed for teachers in England for 2020/21.

2.61 When looking at the data in regards to comparisons between the journey taken by a supply teacher and a teacher working in school, the discrepancies in pay become particularly stark. As referenced earlier, assuming a teacher working on a permanent contract receives an annual pay increment, by the time they reach M6, the difference between the pay of a supply teacher and that of a teacher on a permanent contract could be between £27,017.25 and £7,907.25 per year.

2.62 Furthermore, in England, a teacher on a permanent contract would be eligible to go through the threshold, enabling them to access higher rates of pay up to and including Upper Pay Range 3 (UPR3). As a consequence, the differences between the pay of a supply teacher and that of a teacher on a permanent contract are exacerbated, so that the difference could be between £31,660.20 and £12,550.20 per year.

2.63 Given the vagaries of insecure, intermittent and precarious work for vast swathes of supply teachers, it is extremely optimistic to think that supply teachers will be able to work for all 195 days of the academic year and therefore earn anything near the amounts referenced above. Many supply teachers are therefore earning far less than their permanent counterparts in schools, in spite of their level of experience and expertise.

2.64 Since 2014, the value of supply teachers’ pay has decreased more than if supply teachers’ salaries had increased to keep pace with both CPI and RPI rates of inflation since 2014.

2.65 The NASUWT advocates that a significant above-RPI inflation increase in salary values over a sustained period is necessary to restore supply teachers’ salaries to a level commensurate with their skills and experience, as the evidence outlined above clearly demonstrates that supply teachers are a profoundly exploited and vulnerable group of teachers, many of whom earn less than the £24,000 per year referenced by the Chancellor in the proposed public sector pay freeze on all teachers’ full-time equivalent (FTE) salaries of £24,000 or over.
2.66 As such, the NASUWT calls for all agency teachers to be guaranteed rates of pay commensurate with all other teachers, and for the Review Body to recommend this.

2.67 The situation for supply teachers as agency workers in England is compounded by the fact that employment by or through agencies is currently not pensionable under the Teachers’ Pension Scheme (TPS), leaving many supply teachers no alternative other than to make less favourable pension plans, including reliance on inferior auto-enrolment pension arrangements. There is a strong argument that supply teachers, working alongside other employed teachers, should be afforded the right to access the TPS.

“I am a supply teacher and the pay is borderline unliveable, especially with the rise in cost of living. I am considering leaving the profession as I can be paid better somewhere else. I am starting to regret training last year.” - Teacher, England pay survey, 2022.
3. TRENDS IN TEACHER SUPPLY
https://youtu.be/waPrQU5tAn8

3.1 The Secretary of State's remit letter asks that, in considering its recommendations, the Review Body should have regard to:
‘evidence of the national state of teacher and school leader supply, including rates of recruitment and retention, vacancy rates and the quality of candidates entering the profession.’

3.2 The evidence in this section demonstrates the NASUWT’s serious concerns about current and future rates of recruitment and retention into the teaching profession. Where appropriate, it also addresses teacher supply issues that relate to the ongoing implications of the coronavirus pandemic.

3.3 The Review Body will be aware that over the past decade, the NASUWT has highlighted growing problems in relation to teacher recruitment and retention, as well as the factors that underpin these problems. In its evidence, the Union has placed stress on the significant proportion of the existing workforce trying to leave teaching altogether, the decline in the number of graduates seeking to train to become teachers, and the substantial amount of unfilled Initial Teacher Training (ITT) places. As the impact of the pandemic on the education system recedes, it is likely that these longstanding drivers of the teacher recruitment and retention crisis will begin to reassert themselves.

3.4 The deeply rooted character of the ongoing teacher supply crisis was acknowledged by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee in the findings of its most recent inquiry into these matters. The Committee made clear its view that the Department for Education (DfE) had ‘failed to get a grip on teacher retention’. However, notwithstanding the clear scale and extent of these issues, the DfE has yet to acknowledge that teacher supply is in crisis, a finding inconsistent with the outcomes of the Committee’s inquiry and of much subsequent evidence.

3.5 In January 2019, the DfE published its Teacher Recruitment and Retention Strategy. The DfE acknowledged in this document that factors in respect of growing pupil numbers, the increasing uncompetitiveness of teachers’ pay in comparison to other graduate professions, and declining levels of retention would need to be addressed to improve the current state of teacher supply.

3.6 However, the NASUWT is clear that the DfE’s strategy understates the nature and extent of the teacher recruitment and retention crisis significantly. While some of the proposals set out in the strategy may help to secure marginal improvements, the fundamental drivers of the crisis, including teachers’ and school leaders’ pay and opportunities to achieve pay progression, have yet to be addressed effectively.

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3.7 The basis for the NASUWT’s concerns in respect of teacher supply is set out below.

Recruitment into the teaching profession

3.8 The most recent data from the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) End of Cycle Analysis Report confirms that approximately 52,400 people applied for an initial teacher training (ITT) place through the UCAS Teacher Training (UTT) application scheme in 2020.\footnote{Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) (2021a). Report A: UCAS Teacher Training applicants at End of Cycle 2020. Available at: (https://www.ucas.com/file/438361/download?token=q2I2-o0a), accessed on 31.01.22.}

3.9 This represents an increase in the number of applications of 16% on the equivalent figure for 2019. However, this increase is likely to have been driven to a significant extent by uncertainty among graduates at the early stages of the pandemic over employment opportunities in the wider economy.\footnote{McClean, D. (2021). 'Teacher training applications up by 42%'; National Foundation for Educational Research. Available at: (https://www.nfer.ac.uk/news-events/nfer-blogs/teacher-training-applications-up-by-42-percent/), accessed on 31.01.22.} It is accepted that anticipated economic recessions tend to result in increasing applications for ITT programmes. However, the Review will recall that such increases, evident most recently following the 2007/8 global financial crisis, tend to be short-lived as an exogenous driver of increasing applications to ITT once graduate unemployment begins to fall.\footnote{Hutchings, M. (2010). What impact does the wider economic situation have on teachers’ career decisions? A literature review. (DFE-RR136). Available at: (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181566/DFE-RR136.pdf), accessed on 31.01.22.} It is important to acknowledge that there is some evidence that cohorts of ITT applicants recruited during such periods have tended to demonstrate a higher propensity to leave the profession when wider economic conditions change.\footnote{Ibid.} There can, therefore, be no expectation that the increased recruitment into ITT experienced in 2020/21 will result in sustained improvements in the overall retention situation in the longer term.

3.10 This assessment is supported by interim data from the DfE for the 2021/22 application round, which indicates that mid-phase applications for ITT have begun to decline from the levels evident in the previous year. By the January 2022 checkpoint, the total number of applicants for ITT was 14,101.\footnote{DfE (2021a). Monthly statistics on initial teacher training (ITT) recruitment. Available at: (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/monthly-statistics-on-initial-teacher-training-itt-recruitment#full-publication-update-history), accessed on 17.02.22.} The figure for the comparable stage of the 2020/21 cycle was 18,740, a decline of 25%.\footnote{UCAS (2021). Report A: Teacher Training applicants at 00:06 Monday 18 January 2021. Available at: (https://www.ucas.com/file/414786/download?token=7DqAf8yl), accessed on 17.02.22.} In light of the fact that the December 2019/20 checkpoint figure for ITT applicants was 15,290, it is clear that the impact of the pandemic on graduates’ inclinations to enter teacher training has waned significantly.\footnote{UCAS (2020). Report A: UCAS Teacher Training applicants at 00:06 Monday 20 January 2020. Available at: (https://www.ucas.com/file/312036/download?token=hXgn0En2), accessed on 17.02.22.} To
place this figure into its appropriate historical context, by the equivalent stage of the 2014/15 cycle, 29,890 applicants had entered the ITT process.  

3.11 Given that the pandemic has not changed the fundamental drivers of the teacher supply crisis, it is important to acknowledge the deep-rooted nature of these issues in the development of policy in this area. Immediately prior to the pandemic, official data for 2019/20 confirmed that entry to training programmes only reached 85% of the central target set for that period, substantially lower than the 94% of target figure achieved in 2016/17. Official data shows that overall teacher recruitment was above target in each year from 2006/07 to 2011/12, but was below target in each subsequent year up to 2019/20. It is also important to recognise legitimate concerns that the targets based on the DfE’s Teacher Supply Model may have significantly underestimated the number of teachers required to sustain adequate teacher supply.

3.12 Noting the issues raised above in respect of the implications of the pandemic for teacher recruitment, it is not surprising that for the 2020/21 period, recruitment against the teacher supply model-based targets increased across a range of subject areas. However, even in these circumstances, the targets for mathematics, chemistry, design and technology, modern foreign languages, and physics continued to be missed.

3.13 Consistent with the declining influence of the coronavirus pandemic noted above, performance against key targets has begun to deteriorate in 2021/22. The overall secondary postgraduate ITT target was missed by a substantial margin (82%) in 2020/21; the comparable figure was 101%. Many key subject targets were missed by considerable margins, including music (72% of target recruited), business studies (45%), design and technology (23%), and physics (22%). The number of entrants into geography ITT programmes has fallen every year since 2019/20.

3.14 It should be noted that the education system in England has a longstanding reliance on the skills, talents and expertise of teachers who have gained Qualified Teacher Status (QTS). It is, therefore, a matter of significant concern that the official data indicates that the numbers of such individuals entering teaching in England has declined significantly. In 2018/19, 3,103 teachers from European Economic Area (EEA) countries obtained QTS. By 2020/21,  

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this figure had declined to 1,975 teachers. For teachers with qualifications gained in Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, all of whom have an automatic entitlement to QTS, the annual number of QTS awards declined from 2,030 in 2015/16 to 965 in 2020/21. These declines in the number of teachers trained outside the UK, if sustained in future, are likely to exacerbate the teacher supply crisis.

3.15 Ongoing uncertainty over arrangements for the mutual recognition of teaching qualifications across the EEA and the free movement of EEA nationals into the UK is likely to exert downward pressure on the number of teachers seeking employment as EEA-qualified teachers.

3.16 The recommendations of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) on the salary thresholds teachers from outside the EEA are required to meet also act as a significant brake on recruitment. As the NASUWT has continued to make clear to the MAC, requiring the significant majority of such teachers to secure a post with an annual salary of £30,000 or more creates a significant barrier to employment, given that most posts offer salaries significantly below this threshold. The implications of the Professional Qualifications Bill, if passed, for the future recruitment of teachers from outside the UK remain uncertain.

3.17 In light of this evidence, it is clear that problems with recruitment into teaching are intensifying and creating significant barriers to ensuring the adequacy of teacher supply, underlining the accuracy of characterisations of the current teacher supply position as a ‘crisis’.

3.18 As stated above, as the impact of the pandemic on labour demand begins to unwind, analysts expect greater demand for graduate workers which will be driven by significant increases in pay rates. In a context where teachers’ pay is already lagging behind that of other graduate professions, there is a real risk that teacher recruitment and retention will simply be unable to keep pace unless there is a substantial increase in teachers’ salaries.

Teacher wastage

3.19 Levels of wastage from the teaching profession, other than for reasons of retirement or death-in-service, have risen significantly over the past decade. The School Workforce Census (SWC) confirms that between 2011/12 and 2018/19, the number of teachers leaving teaching annually for reasons other than retirement or death-in-service rose from 26,282 to 34,528, an increase of 31% over the period. While the numbers of those leaving the profession for these reasons fell back to 29,523 in 2019/20, the transient nature of the influence of the pandemic on wastage rates confirms that they will once again begin to increase unless effective remedial action is taken.

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This concern is underlined by the outcomes of the NASUWT’s *Data on teachers’ lives during the pandemic* report, published in November 2021, which found that:

- 49% of teachers felt that their job satisfaction had declined over the past 12 months;
- 55% of teachers indicated that they did not think that they were empowered professionally to deliver the best outcomes for their pupils;
- 46% would not recommend their workplace to family and friends; and
- 61% had seriously considered quitting the profession altogether in the last 12 months. Footnote?

It has always been the case that some individuals entering teaching decide to move to another occupational sector, either during their training or relatively shortly after its completion. However, official data confirms that retention rates among those who have recently acquired QTS have dropped significantly. The proportion of qualified teachers remaining in the profession after one, three and five years of qualifying has declined substantially.\(^{31}\)

**Table 1: Proportion of teachers in service after one, three and five years of qualifying in 2010 and 2019 (per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DfE School Workforce Census*

However, evidence confirms that the depiction of retention concerns as matters pertaining principally or solely to the early stages of teachers’ careers is entirely misplaced. For example, by 2020, over 40% of those who had entered the teaching profession ten years previously were no longer teaching.\(^{32}\) Data published by the DfE in 2020 confirmed that less than half of those teachers who had qualified 20 years previously were still employed in the state education sector as qualified teachers.\(^{33}\) Almost a third (31%) of those leaving teaching for reasons other than retirement or death-in-service were aged between 30 and 39, with 23% of those leaving aged between 40 and 49.\(^{34}\)

Feedback received by the NASUWT from experienced teachers who have left the profession highlights a range of causal factors. These include: dissatisfaction with overall levels of pay; a lack of guaranteed access to pay and career progression routes; erosion of relative pay; and responsibilities that should attract a TLR payment not being remunerated appropriately.

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\(^{31}\) DfE (2021c). *op.cit.*

\(^{32}\) Ibid.


\(^{34}\) DfE (2021c). *op.cit.*
3.24 This evidence emphasises the need to ensure that pay-based solutions to addressing the recruitment and retention crisis address pay across the whole experience range and not just salaries at the early stages of teachers' careers.

3.25 The DfE continues to place significant emphasis on the ability of training bursaries and scholarships, some of which are as high as £26,000, to support recruitment into the profession. Notwithstanding the focus of such schemes on trainee teachers in a limited range of subjects in a context where no phase or subject has remained untouched by the teacher supply crisis, the Review Body will be aware of the lack of evidence on the efficacy of these programmes. For example, the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts' most recent consideration of this issue continued to raise serious questions about the extent to which such programmes make a worthwhile contribution to sustaining adequate levels of teacher supply.

3.26 A review of such schemes by the National Audit Office (NAO) drew attention to the fact that the DfE had not assessed the impact of bursaries on applicants' success, or the number who go on to qualify and teach, and that their positive impact on recruitment and retention could not, therefore, be substantiated. The Review Body will be aware that concerns about the efficacy of these schemes are longstanding and is reminded that further extension of the bursary system is not an alternative to the need for a substantial uplift to teachers' pay in addressing the teacher retention crisis.

Retirements

3.27 The current demographic composition of the teacher and school leader workforce highlights the implications of retirements for the future adequacy of teacher supply.

3.28 In 2020/21, 4,691 teachers left teaching due to age-related retirement. As anticipated, at the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic, this level fell significantly in comparison with immediately preceding years. However, as the impact of the pandemic recedes, it is likely that levels of retirement will increase to levels seen in the previous decade. It is important to note in this context that the SWC confirms that almost 19% of the total teacher population is aged 50 or over and that, as a result, age retirements are likely to continue to exert pressure on securing and maintaining sufficient teacher supply.

3.29 In addition to retirements, evidence suggests that a significant proportion of teachers will continue to seek early exit from the profession, including through the use of actuarially reduced pensions. Of the 9,561 teachers in the state-funded school sector accessing Teachers' Pensions benefits for the first time

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36 NAO. (2016). *op.cit.*


38 DfE (2021c). *op.cit.*

39 Ibid.
in 2020/21, 4,620 (48%) took actuarially reduced pensions as a result of retirement before reaching eligibility for full pension benefits. By comparison, the equivalent proportion of actuarially reduced pensions in 2018/19 was 43%.

3.30 It is important to acknowledge the high financial costs to which teachers electing to take actuarially reduced benefits are subject. The scale of the income effects experienced by teachers accessing pension entitlements on this basis serves to illustrate the extent of the teacher retention crisis, given that almost half of all teachers in 2020/21 regarded taking an actuarially reduced pension as a preferable option to remaining in the profession.

3.31 International evidence confirms that England has experienced the largest decline in the proportion of teachers aged over 50 of any Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) jurisdiction over the period 2005 to 2017, and the youngest teaching workforces among OECD member jurisdictions.\(^{40}\)

3.32 The NASUWT is clear that the highly unusual demographic composition of the teaching workforce in England is directly related to widespread age discrimination across the school system. The Union continues to encounter many older teachers who are forced out of the profession because of their age and perceptions about their relatively high wage costs by employers.

3.33 In the NASUWT’s experience, older teachers are at disproportionate risk of capability and disciplinary procedures, report being denied access to professional development, and are often put under intense pressure to leave their jobs.

3.34 It is for this reason that the NASUWT continues to call on the Government to take more effective action to tackle an increasingly prevalent culture in schools that fails to value older teachers for their experience and expertise.

3.35 However, it is critical to recognise that declines in the proportion of teachers aged 50 or over will not ameliorate the ongoing teacher recruitment and retention crisis, and that claims to the contrary do not withstand scrutiny.

3.36 As noted above, the increasing tendency of teachers to leave the profession well before retirement age, combined with continued failures to recruit sufficient trainee teachers, will continue to more than offset any teacher supply implications of ongoing changes to the demographic composition of the teaching workforce.

Vacancies

3.37 The Review Body will be aware that the basis upon which annual vacancy rate data is calculated was changed by the DfE in 2010, so that it is now collected in November, rather than in January. The current data, therefore, excludes the significant number of vacancies that arise at the end of the

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calendar year and are, therefore, likely to understate the extent to which teaching posts are not filled permanently.

3.38 In assessing official evidence on vacancies, the Review Body should note the concerns raised by the NAO in relation to the potential for official vacancy figures to underestimate the current extent of unfilled posts across the system. It is, therefore, difficult to obtain a reliable impression of the recruitment and retention pressures across the system from official vacancy data.

3.39 It is also clear that difficulties in recruiting and retaining teachers continue to compel schools to deploy teachers to teach in subject areas which are not their first specialism, or for which they do not possess appropriate academic qualifications. The most recent SWC data available confirm that only 87% of mathematics lessons in year groups 7-13 in 2019 were taught by teachers with any relevant post-A-level qualification in the subject. The SWC further confirms that only 73% of physics lessons across these year groups, 82% of chemistry lessons and 50% of computer science lessons were taught by staff with relevant post-A-level qualifications.

3.40 Pupil/teacher ratios (PTRs) also provide an important indication of the capability of the system to recruit and retain an adequate complement of teachers and have also been affected by the recruitment and retention crisis. Across all state-funded secondary schools, the PTR rose from 14.9% in 2011/12 to 16.6% in 2020/21.

Table 2: Secondary pupil/teacher ratio (PTR) in state-funded secondary schools 2011/12 to 2020/21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/18</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/19</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019/20</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020/21</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfE School Workforce Census

42 DfE (2020b) op.cit.; DfE (2021d); op.cit.
43 Ibid.
The teacher supply crisis: implications

3.41 It is clear that the problems in respect of teacher recruitment and retention highlighted above will have a significant impact on the provision of education in schools. Pupil numbers are continuing to rise in the secondary sector. DfE data confirms that the state-funded school sector will continue to experience significant and sustained increases in pupil numbers over the next decade. In the secondary sector, the overall pupil population is projected to reach 3,231,476 in 2024, 8% higher than the current population.44

3.42 This combination of increasing pupil numbers and constraints on teacher recruitment and retention will result in significant shortages in teachers and school leaders unless urgent action is taken by the DfE to implement policies to secure adequate rates of teacher recruitment and retention.

3.43 The NASUWT remains concerned about the implications of the teacher supply crisis on the future recruitment of teachers into leadership roles. DfE assessments of this issue have failed to take account of the implications for leader recruitment and retention of the broader teacher supply issues. School leaders are drawn from the wider teacher workforce, and teacher supply issues will inevitably impact on leadership recruitment.

3.44 It is reasonable to conclude that the impact on recruitment and retention of the current teacher supply crisis will, in time, result in problems in securing a sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced teachers to fill middle and senior leadership roles. The NASUWT believes it is essential to address teacher recruitment and retention issues to support school leader supply strategies.

Policy influences on teacher supply and further action

3.45 As emphasised elsewhere in this evidence, the suppression of teachers' pay has resulted in significant implications for teacher supply and is a clear and substantial driver of the recruitment and retention crisis.

3.46 However, the Review Body must continue to acknowledge evidence of the other drivers of this crisis. As the Union has indicated in previous submissions to the Review Body, issues relating to unnecessary and excessive workload burdens, inadequate support for teacher and school leader wellbeing, diminished levels of job satisfaction, a lack of an effective entitlement to professional training and development opportunities, and debilitating working environments and cultures have all impacted adversely on teacher supply. Government policy continues to fail to address these longstanding barriers to securing adequate levels of teacher and school leader recruitment and retention, and it is clear that teacher supply will not be placed on a more sustainable footing until it does so.

3.47 However, it is evident that no strategy for resolving the teacher supply crisis will be effective unless it addresses the current significant shortcomings in arrangements for the remuneration of teachers and school leaders. In particular, the Review Body will have noted the findings of the independent report produced for the UK Office of Manpower Economics (OME) on teacher retention which make clear that retention is a significant issue and that pay is central to the propensity of teachers to contemplate leaving the profession.  

3.48 From its prior submissions to the Review Body, it is clear that the DfE continues to ignore the considerable extent to which unreasonable barriers to pay progression and successively low cost of living increases impact adversely on the retention of more experienced teachers, on their peers who have more recently entered the profession, and on the inclination of graduates to contemplate entering teaching.

3.49 The DfE's recent submissions to the Review Body reflect its deeply erroneous view to date that there is a less pressing case for addressing later career-stage teachers' pay than the pay of those who have joined the profession more recently. In large part, it has justified this perspective by insisting that potential teachers are likely to place extra weight on the salary that applies to them in the short run as opposed to longer-term pay when assessing the attractiveness of salaries available in teaching.

3.50 However, there is no robust evidence to support this assertion in respect of graduates and serving teachers in England. It is the NASUWT's experience that potential entrants into teaching and those who have recently qualified as teachers are influenced not only by short-term pay considerations but also by the nature and availability of pay and career advancement opportunities. This view is substantiated by the findings of the independent study on teacher retention, referenced above, which show that more experienced teachers are likely to be particularly sensitive to changes in pay. It is, therefore, clear that any refusal to address the pay of later career-stage teachers will not only fail to tackle retention problems across this section of the workforce in the longer term but will also continue to exert a powerful disincentive effect on recruitment into the profession and early career-stage retention.

3.51 International evidence from OECD data also confirms that pay for teachers in England after 15 years' experience is still far behind those of other jurisdictions that the Government continues to identify as high-performing or fast-improving models for the education system in England. The OECD's data supports the NASUWT's longstanding view that policy efforts should be directed towards improving the pay of more experienced, as well as less experienced, teachers in England significantly if it is to match those of important international comparators.

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46 Ibid.

Table 3: Lower secondary teachers’ salaries after 15 years’ experience (selected countries) (US Dollars) 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>$109,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$88,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$81,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$71,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$66,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>$62,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$62,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$60,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>$59,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>$57,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$55,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Flemish Community)</td>
<td>$55,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>$53,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD
4. THE WIDER STATE OF THE LABOUR MARKET AND ECONOMY
https://youtu.be/D_6KffNB4wc

HM Treasury Submission to Pay Review Bodies

4.1 HM Treasury has provided a submission to all pay review bodies (PRBs). Much of the submission focuses on the claimed differential between pay across the whole of the public and private sectors. The NASUWT is sure that the Review Body will wish to focus on evidence which is more focused and nuanced than this.

4.2 However, the NASUWT does draw to the Review Body’s attention the inaccuracy of the Treasury’s implication that, as public sector workers, teachers are doing better than workers elsewhere in the economy.

4.3 In evidence to the Review Body since 2010, the NASUWT has stressed how teachers’ pay has fallen behind the pay of both comparable professions and wider workforces across the economy. This has been profoundly exacerbated by the 2021/22 pay freeze. Unlike teachers, many workforces across the UK have received significant pay awards during 2021.

4.4 Research by IDR demonstrates the distribution of whole economy pay awards towards the end of 2021. The following chart relates to 41 pay awards, covering 1,004,748 employees:

Distribution of pay awards - three months to end of October 2021

4.5 Only 12% of pay awards were pay freezes; 22% of pay awards were greater than 4%; and over 98% of teachers in England, all qualified teachers, received no pay award.

4.6 The following IDR chart demonstrates how whole economy pay awards have risen during 2021. IDR summarises the situation as follows: ‘As the chart below shows, the whole economy median fell to just 1.6% in the three months to May and then peaked at 2.3% in August. The impact of recruitment and retention problems following the reopening of the economy, and in the most recent period, the sharp rise in the cost of living, have contributed to the upward trend.’

![Whole economy pay increases, December 2020 to October 2021](chart)

Source: IDR

4.7 However, the whole economy pay increase data is distorted by the impact of the pay freeze in the public sector, as IDR outlines: ‘The median in the public sector is lower as a result of the Government’s pay freeze policy for most staff this year...The median has remained at 1.0%, with a much lower interquartile range in comparison to the private sector.’

4.8 Private sector pay increases during 2021 therefore demonstrate a higher median than the whole economy pay increases:

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49 Ibid.
4.9 The NASUWT stresses to the Review Body that these charts demonstrate how unfairly teachers were treated in 2021 alone, when compared to other workers. This unfairness is even greater when pay across the whole economy from 2010 onwards is taken into account.

4.10 It is important, also, that the Review Body does not fall into the trap of believing that, because some teachers were eligible for pay progression in 2021/22, they have not suffered a pay freeze.

4.11 In its evidence to the STRB’s 31st Report, the DfE analysed the SWC pay data to ascertain the numbers of teachers who received a pay increase which was higher than the annual pay award in 2018/19. As the DfE has indicated, the reasons for this can include promotion to a post which is remunerated by a TLR payment or on the leadership spine, in addition to receiving performance-pay progression.

4.12 For teachers moving to the UPR, or already on the UPR, the pay progression success rate is evaluated by the DfE as follows: ‘For teachers on M6, U1 or U2, our evidence last year, using SWC data, indicates around 1 in 3 teachers in consecutive service progress or are promoted each year.’

4.13 In other words, the best pay progression rate for teachers on M6, U1 or U2 is that one in three teachers achieved pay progression in 2018/19. This would only be the case, however, if none of these teachers received promotion (into leadership or the awarding of a TLR payment), which will not be the case. Pay progression for M6, U1 or U2 teachers is, in reality, running at less than one third.

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50 Government evidence to the STRB, February 2021.
4.14 The DfE’s evidence to the 30th Review Body indicated that 65.3% of teachers are paid on M6 or on the upper pay range (UPR). A further 42.5% of teachers are paid on the maximum of the Main Pay Range (MPR) or the UPR, with 30.3% of teachers paid on UPS3, where there is no possibility of pay progression at all. These teachers, the backbone of the profession, endured a complete pay freeze in 2021/22.

4.15 In terms of the Treasury’s evidence, the NASUWT also wishes to address the comments which the Treasury makes in its submission that pay increases for public sector workforces may have an inflationary impact.

4.16 IDR addresses this by posing the following question: ‘With inflation rising, could pay pressures from employees fuel a “wage-inflation spiral”?’ As IDR comments:

‘With wages coming first in the eponymous equation, many suppose that pay increases are the trigger for inflation. But this is clearly not the case. Our articles on the latest official inflation estimates (page 20) and economists’ forecasts for inflation (page 9) show that the current generalised rise in prices has its roots in pandemic-produced disruptions of supply chains on the one hand, and higher energy and oil prices on the other.

‘The other problem with the notion of a “wage-price spiral” is that it also ignores the actual relationship between the two, which is that wage rises always lag behind inflation. The chart below shows this and, inter alia, a weak association between pay and inflation, very clearly. Since the economic crisis of 2009, the median basic pay award has been more or less stuck at between 2 and 2½%. When inflation has risen the median settlement hasn’t followed it upwards, though neither has it followed inflation down when the latter has fallen.

‘So ideas about wages somehow causing inflation ignore the wider factors that produce price rises and mischaracterise the real relationship between the two.’

51 Government evidence to the STRB, January 2020.
52 Ibid.
4.17 The TUC has produced economic evidence to pay review bodies (PRBs), which is included as an Annex in this submission. The TUC’s analysis addresses HM Treasury’s claims of the inflationary impact of higher salaries in the public sector and concludes:

‘Workers should not be punished for inflation through declining pay or a slower economy. Arguments that the “tightness” of the labour market or the strength of the economy mean that inflation is a risk are overplayed. Wage growth is slowing and employment levels remain down 600,000 on pre-pandemic levels. Consumer demand remains down with retail sales falling by 3.7 per cent in December.

‘Instead pay should be bolstered to increase demand and strengthen the economy. The Treasury acknowledges that high inflation is due to global supply chain issues that are likely to be temporary. Wages and demand are not driving inflation. Pay has stagnated for over a decade and wage growth is needed to get the economy growing.’

4.18 The TUC correctly identifies that, in its 2022 evidence to PRBs, HM Treasury is arguing for a policy of fiscal austerity in public sector pay in the interests of the wider economy. As the TUC observes, this policy has a history of failure:

‘Public sector pay is a key lever the government can use to get money flowing through local economies. It stimulates growth and supports government finances. Attempts to restrain pay growth in the public sector are counterproductive. Over the last decade public sector pay restraint has been one part of an austerity policy that has fuelled low levels of growth and rising public debt. Public sector net debt grew from 48 per cent of GDP in 2008-9 to around 80 per cent from 2014-15 onwards while public sector pay was frozen or restrained. Higher pay and a stronger economy are the best route to sound public finances.’
4.19 In January 2022, High Fliers Research carried out a study of the latest graduate vacancies and starting salaries at the UK’s 100 best-known and most successful employers. The research institute found that graduate recruitment at employers that featured in *The Times Top 100 Graduate Employers* recovered well in 2021, following a substantial cut in graduate vacancies in 2020, at the start of the coronavirus pandemic. High Fliers also found that:

- the number of graduates recruited in 2021 was higher than expected – an annual increase of 9.4%, compared with graduate recruitment in 2020;
- the country’s top employers recruited 2,400 more graduates in 2021 than had been expected at the beginning of the 2020-21 academic year, and graduate recruitment increased in nine out of 15 of the most sought-after industries and business sectors;
- the latest recruitment targets for the country’s leading employers show that the number of graduate jobs on offer in 2022 is expected to increase by a further 15.7%, the largest annual rise in graduate recruitment for more than 15 years;

### Table 2.8 Analysis of Graduate Vacancies in 2022, by Industry or Business Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry or Business Sector</th>
<th>Recruitment target for 2022, as published in Sept 2021</th>
<th>Recruitment target for 2022, as revised in Jan 2022</th>
<th>% change from recruitment in 2021</th>
<th>Vacancies added (in), compared with 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounting &amp; professional services</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>7,424</td>
<td>▲ 25.9%</td>
<td>1,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>▲ 1.9%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking &amp; finance</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>▲ 18.9%</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity &amp; voluntary sector</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>▲ 4.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>▲ 14.3%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>▲ 27.0%</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer goods</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>▲ 11.4%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering &amp; Industrial</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>▲ 19.0%</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment banking</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>▲ 2.9%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>▲ 1.4%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>▲ 15.3%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; energy</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>▲ 38.0%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>4,748</td>
<td>▲ 2.5%</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retailing</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>▲ 12.3%</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>2,355</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>▲ 38.9%</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL SECTORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,378</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,411</strong></td>
<td>▲ 15.7%</td>
<td><strong>3,865</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *The Graduate Market in 2022*

- employers in all 15 of the key industries and business sectors for new graduates are planning to expand their recruitment in 2022. The number of graduate vacancies available is now 11% higher than the pre-pandemic peak in graduate recruitment recorded in 2019;
- accounting and professional services firms are expected to be the largest recruiters of new graduates in 2022, with a record 7,400 entry-level vacancies available for university leavers;

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53 [https://www.highfliers.co.uk/download/2022/graduate_market/GM22-report.pdf](https://www.highfliers.co.uk/download/2022/graduate_market/GM22-report.pdf)

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for the first time in eight years, graduate starting salaries at the UK’s leading graduate employers are set to increase in 2022, to a new median starting salary of £32,000; it will not be lost on the Review Body that a teachers’ starting salary of £30k is already uncompetitive;

three of the country’s best-known graduate employers are paying salaries in excess of £50,000 this year and a quarter of the country’s top employers now offer graduate starting salaries of more than £40,000.

4.20 In its most recent Labour Market Overview UK, the ONS identified the extent to which the economy was reviving at the end of the coronavirus pandemic.54 As the ONS has commented:

‘Our latest Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimates for October to December 2021 show a continuing recovery in the labour market, with a quarterly increase in the employment rate and a decrease in the unemployment rate…

‘The number of job vacancies in November 2021 to January 2022 rose to a new record of 1,298,400, an increase of 513,700 from its pre-coronavirus

54 ONS, Labour market overview UK, February 2022.
January to March 2020 level. However, the rate of growth in vacancies continued to slow down. The ratio of vacancies to every 100 employee jobs continued to rise, reaching a record high of 4.3 in November 2021 to January 2022, with the majority of industry sectors displaying record high ratios.

**IDR research**

4.21 In this evidence, the NASUWT has previously drawn attention to IDR’s identification of the Review Body’s commentary on the deeply uncompetitive levels of teachers’ pay. IDR has compared the level of teachers’ pay with that of comparable graduate professions in 2007, 2014 and 2021.

4.22 Using average gross earnings, primary and nursery school teachers ranked bottom out of 13 comparable graduate professions in 2007, 2014 and 2021. Secondary teachers ranked 8th out of 13 comparable graduate professions in 2021, but IDR reports that this was a consequence of higher earnings for secondary teachers (for example, leadership pay in academies) raising the average figure level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>2007 rank</th>
<th>2014 rank</th>
<th>2021 rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education teachers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and nursery education teachers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ASHE

4.23 The following IDR table shows the 2021 pay differentials between teaching and comparable graduate professions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average gross weekly pay £pw</th>
<th>Diff. with secondary teachers</th>
<th>Diff. with primary and nursery teachers</th>
<th>Median gross weekly pay £pw</th>
<th>Diff. with secondary teachers</th>
<th>Diff. with primary and nursery teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal professionals</td>
<td>1,256.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>1,006.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health professionals</td>
<td>1,040.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>905.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information technology and telecommunications professionals</td>
<td>955.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>893.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management consultants and business analysts</td>
<td>921.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>835.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chartered and certified accountants</td>
<td>884.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>809.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering professionals</td>
<td>874.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>837.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical scientists</td>
<td>844.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>802.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological scientists and biochemists</td>
<td>803.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>747.5</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 IDR, A review of school teachers’ pay in England compared with other graduate professions, 1.5.
56 Ibid, 1.7.
4.24 As IDR has observed in its analysis:

‘Table 3...addresses this by presenting the individual pay differentials between the two teaching groups and each of the other graduate professions in 2021, illustrating that median and average gross weekly earnings for teachers in England trailed those for the majority of the other graduate professions.

‘To provide greater clarity, the table is colour-coded with differentials shaded blue where teachers’ earnings are lower than those for the other professions and red where they are higher. It is clear that the table is predominantly blue – over 80% – and also that, in many cases, the differentials are significant, especially when the average levels are considered.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>profession</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chartered surveyors</td>
<td>800.8</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>756.0</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>800.6</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>824.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical scientists</td>
<td>773.3</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>688.6</td>
<td>-13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education teaching professionals</td>
<td>803.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>797.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and nursery teaching professionals</td>
<td>752.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>741.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ASHE
5. **AFFORDABILITY**

5.1 The Secretary of State has issued a remit letter which states that the affordability of a pay award must be taken into consideration.

5.2 The NASUWT asks the Review Body to challenge the premise which underlies what the Government is asking it to consider. The Review Body cannot model a pay system on the basis of anticipating/responding to the particular needs and circumstances of every one of England’s 23,000 schools. The system for funding schools means that schools can underspend or overspend their budgets.

5.3 The Government can also put in place measures to ensure that the delivery of a pay award does not result in adverse wider consequences for any school by instituting a ring-fenced teachers’ pay grant. Indeed, a teachers’ pay grant process was utilised by the Government to ensure delivery of the teachers’ 2019 and 2020 pay awards. The DfE has made a policy decision to wrap up the funding for a teachers’ pay award in 2022/23 and 2023/24 in core National Funding Formula (NFF) funding, but this does not have to be the case.

5.4 The reality is that the Government can afford what it wishes to afford. The write-off of more than £9bn in personal protective equipment (PPE) procurement during the pandemic is just one illustration of the opportunity for the Government to choose what to prioritise. The Government must now demonstrate that it wishes to prioritise teachers at national level.

5.5 The NASUWT always advocates that the Review Body should make its recommendations without being constrained by affordability factors, but it would be wrong to make no comment on the issue of affordability in this section of its evidence.

5.6 On 16 December 2021, the Minister of State for School Standards issued the following written statement:

‘Overall, taking the DSG allocations and the supplementary funding together, core schools funding is increasing by £4 billion in 2022-23 – a 5% increase in real terms per pupil from 2021-22. This includes an increase in mainstream school funding, for the 5-16 age group, of £2.5 billion. This is equivalent to a 5.8%, or £300, cash increase in funding per pupil on average. Every local authority area is forecast to see an above-inflation increase in mainstream school funding, with each local authority seeing at least a 4.7% increase per pupil.

‘Nationally, high needs funding, including the supplementary funding, is increasing by over £1 billion (13%).’

5.7 This Ministerial Statement confirmed the additional funding schools were receiving, which was announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 2021 Spending Review.

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57 [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-12-16/hcws508](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-12-16/hcws508)

5.8 In the 2021 Spending Review, the DfE secured an increase of £4.7bn by 2024-25, compared to the Department’s original 2022-23 plans. This included £1.6bn in additional funding for 2022-23 budgets, on top of the year-on-year increase of £2.4bn already confirmed in the 2019 Spending Review. Beyond 2022-23, the funding announced in the 2021 Spending Review means that there will be, year on year, real terms per pupil increases to school funding, equivalent to a cash increase of £1,500 per pupil by 2024-25 compared to 2019-20.

5.9 The NASUWT fully accepts that not all of the additional £4 billion in the core schools budget in 2022/23 will be spent on teachers’ pay. However, the most recent Schools Workforce Census (the 2020 Census) gives a full-time equivalent (FTE) figure of 461,088 teachers in state-funded schools in England. This breaks down as a 2022/23 increase in school funding of £8,675 per teacher, so the NASUWT asks the Review Body to accept that a substantial pay increase for the teaching profession is affordable.

5.10 The NASUWT has previously brought to the attention of the Review Body the excessive spending on academy trust leadership pay, particularly Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. This is supported by the most recently published DfE data on this issue: the academy sector annual report and accounts for 2019/20.

5.11 From 2018/19 to 2019/20, the number of staff members who are paid more than £200,001 increased from 43 to 66, and the number of staff members paid more than £150k increased from 249 to 339. This is particularly significant because the DfE has supposedly had a policy of challenging academy trustee leadership salaries over £150k in recent years. Irrespective of this, pay of the top earners in the academy sector has increased.

5.12 However, as in previous years, the DfE’s trustee remuneration report does not tell the entire story. The 200,001+ salary band (66 staff) includes salaries much higher than this. For example, the Harris Federation CEO’s salary rose from the £450k to £455k pay band in 2019 to the £455k to £460k pay band in 2020, while employer pension contributions towards the CEO’s pension rose from the £50k to £55k pay band in 2019 to the £70k to £75k pay band in 2020.

5.13 The NASUWT will address the issue of leadership pay in greater detail in the ‘overview of the wider issues’ section of this evidence, but suffice it to say at this stage that the increase in academy trust leadership salaries is an indication of affordability within the system in respect of teachers’ pay.

5.14 On 16 December 2021 the DfE published information about revenue balances in maintained schools for the 2020/21 financial year. This confirmed that, as of 31 March 2021, 91% of schools were in surplus, 8% were in deficit and less than 1% had a zero balance. There had been a 2019/20-2020/21 reduction of the schools in deficit from 12% to 8%, which is the biggest year-on-year reduction since records on school balances started being kept in 2003. Again,
taking into account the substantial increase in school funding in 2022/23 and 2023/24, this is an indication of the affordability of a substantial pay increase for teachers.

5.15 At the point at which this NASUWT evidence was produced, the DfE had not published data on academy trust revenue surpluses for 2020/21, but information available in academy trust annual reports and accounts indicates that surpluses have risen in many instances from 2019/20 to 2020/21.62

5.16 For example, Schools Week reports that Outwood Grange Academy Trust’s (OGAT’s) overall reserves rose from £22.8 million to £31.9 million. United Learning’s reserves rose from £17 million to £31.8 million and Plymouth CAST’s reserves rose from £2.8 million to £5.3 million.

5.17 The NASUWT is not necessarily passing adverse comment on this. For example, OGAT implements automatic pay progression for teachers as an alternative to performance-related pay, and the Trust is therefore spending its income on teachers’ pay, which the Union applauds. The NASUWT is drawing attention to these issues to illustrate the affordability of a substantial pay increase for teachers.

62 https://schoolsweek.co.uk/silver-linings-big-academy-trusts-see-reserves-boosted-by-covid-windfalls/
6. OVERVIEW OF THE WIDER ISSUES

6.1 The NASUWT is happy to set out what it believes are key, urgent wider issues for the Review Body to address. The NASUWT asks the Review Body to accept that the teachers’ pay and conditions framework needs to be completely recast. The NASUWT believes that, in addition to the matters for recommendation in this remit, it is vital that the following elements of the pay and conditions framework are recast:

- The universality of the pay award;
- Performance-related pay progression;
- Restoration of pay portability;
- Increase in planning, preparation and assessment (PPA) time.

The universality of the pay award

6.2 The NASUWT has previously brought to the attention of the Review Body the failure of some schools to pay the annual pay award to their teachers. The Review Body will understand that the latest relevant data on this issue relates to the 2020/21 pay award, given the pay freeze in 2021/22.

6.3 The NASUWT carried out a pay survey in December 2020 and January 2021 into patterns in the implementation of the September 2020 pay award. The survey closed on 25 January, just prior to the submission of this initial evidence to the Review Body.

6.4 The survey found that 22% of teachers had not received confirmation of any pay award in 2020/21, with 9% of teachers being told that they would not receive any pay award in 2020/21 at all. At this point in time, therefore, the 2020 pay award does not apply to approximately one third of the profession.

6.5 It is the deliberate policy of the DfE to promote the pay award as optional for schools. The pay award section in the 2020 STPCD describes the implementation of the pay award as a pay progression decision:

‘Except for teachers and leaders on the minima of their respective ranges or group ranges, schools must determine – in accordance with their own pay policy – how to take account of the uplift to the national framework in making individual pay progression decisions. In order to facilitate these decisions and to support a transparent and coherent career pathway and to assist with recruitment and retention, advisory pay points for the main and upper pay ranges have been set out at Annex 3.’

6.6 To compound the damage done by this, the pay award paragraph goes on to read:

‘However, the advisory points are advisory and not mandatory and all decisions relating to pay progression must continue to be based on performance.’

6.7 It is unsurprising, therefore, that many teachers did not receive the 2020/21 pay award.
6.8 The NASUWT asserts that it makes a mockery of the Review Body’s pay award recommendations for schools to continue to be given the flexibility to withhold this award; indeed, for the DfE to actively promote the withholding of the pay award in the STPCD.

6.9 Teachers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have a statutory entitlement to the teachers’ annual pay award, and England is out of kilter with the rest of the UK in this regard.

6.10 All consultees apart from the DfE, including employer and National Governors Association (NGA) consultees, have called for the annual pay award to be universally applied and not linked to performance. The NASUWT calls on the Review Body to listen to the overwhelming majority of consultees and make the annual teachers’ pay award a statutory entitlement for all teachers and school leaders. This can be achieved by the return to statutory pay scales for all teachers and school leaders.

**Teachers’ Pension Scheme indexation**

6.11 Over the last few months, it has become clear that there is a particular detriment which teachers suffer if their pay is frozen. The issue relates to indexation in the final salary section of the Teachers’ Pension Scheme (TPS). The 2010 TPS Regulations, which apply to this scheme, establish that the calculation method for the ‘best consecutive three years in ten’ average salary only applies indexation if the salary rate changes. This leads to non-indexation of benefits during periods of pay freeze and consequent pension losses for teachers and school leaders.

6.12 Put in simple terms, where no pay award is applied to a teacher, teachers will suffer a ‘double whammy’ of a pay and pensions indexation detriment with their final salary pension. This will disproportionately affect older teachers.

6.13 The potential pensions detriment arising from a pay freeze makes it even more crucial that the annual pay award is universally applied from 2022/23 onwards, and the NASUWT asks the Review Body to issue a clear recommendation that this should be the case.

**Performance-related pay progression**

6.14 There is ample research on performance-related pay systems in both the public and private sectors. This indicates that the nationalised banking industry and the teachers’ pay framework in England are the main parts of the public sector where there is performance-related pay. The NHS abolished its performance-related pay for doctors (clinical excellence awards) during the coronavirus pandemic. Even when this was in place, the performance-related element of doctors’ pay was much smaller than in the teachers’ pay system in England.

6.15 In the public sector, annual time-served pay progression is, by far, the most common method of retaining the workforce. This is because it gives complete certainty over future pay levels and enables workers to plan for future financial commitments, such as mortgages and starting families. Annual time-served pay progression also recognises that professional workers, in particular,
deepen their expertise as their experience in post grows. However, automatic incremental progression pay scales should not be too long, as they can become indirectly discriminatory if there is a changing workforce profile over time.

6.16 It is vital that the definition of a year of employment for time-served pay progression purposes is fully non-discriminatory and that part-time teachers and teachers on maternity leave are not disadvantaged by the definition which is used.

6.17 Performance-related pay progression in the maintained sector in England is fundamentally flawed and has been rejected by other UK nations and internationally as a method of remunerating teachers.

6.18 Wales has replaced teachers’ performance-related pay with automatic annual progression. Scotland has never implemented performance-related pay for teachers and Northern Ireland has automatic annual progression on the main pay scale. Northern Ireland does have a threshold and an upper pay scale; in Northern Ireland, however, all pay progression is automatic in practice. The Isle of Man, which has, until recently, followed the 2013 STPCD arrangements for performance-related pay progression, has now decided to replace it with automatic annual pay progression.

6.19 Increasingly, the largest employers of teachers in England, large multi-academy trusts (MATs), have decided to replace performance-related pay arrangements with annual time-served pay progression. This includes the following MATs:
- E-ACT;
- Co-operative Academies Trust;
- Wickersley Partnership Trust;
- Oasis Community Learning (OCL);
- The Elliot Foundation Academies Trust (TEKAT);
- Outwood Grange Academy Trust (OGAT);
- Northern Education Trust;
- Focus Trust;
- Enquire;
- GLF;
- CMAT;
- LAAT;
- Paradigm Academies Trust;
- Consilium Academies Trust (with a nine-point scale, removing threshold assessment);
- Warriner Multi-Academy Trust (with a nine-point scale, removing threshold assessment);
- St Barts Multi-Academy Trust;
- Central Learning Partnership Trust;
- David Ross Education Trust.
The failure of performance-related pay

“\textit{I progressed to M6 within my first four years of teaching. I’ve now been an M6 teacher for ten years! In real terms I am getting poorer every year as there is no UPS available within my school. Apparently, I mean our head is paid over £85k but the two of us on M6 can’t progress to UPS, despite all the additional support we give new staff and subjects we lead. I am barely breaking even with my wage due to being a single parent with an £850 mortgage... I am so worried about what bills to pay come April with everything rising EXCEPT my wage, again!”} – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

6.20 One of the key pay entitlements for teachers which has been removed since 2010 is the entitlement, unless in circumstances where performance is unsatisfactory, to incremental pay progression.

6.21 This was set out in the provisions of STPCDs through to 2012, for mandatory points on the main pay scale:

‘\textit{The relevant body must award... a point for each year of employment (interpreted in accordance with paragraph 1.8) as a classroom teacher completed since the teacher was first so placed unless notification has taken place in accordance with sub-paragraph 1.6 that the teacher’s service has not been satisfactory in respect of any such year.’}

6.22 In 2013, this provision was replaced with performance-related pay, which has been a key driver of discrimination and the depression of teachers' pay levels.

6.23 In its 27th Report, the Review Body restated a recommendation which it had made in previous reports:

‘\textit{Pay policies should also be designed to reward good teachers, who should continue to expect to reach the maximum of the main pay range in around five years, with exceptional teachers progressing faster.}’ \textsuperscript{63}

6.24 In its 26th Report, the Review Body reported that this was also the aspiration of the Secretary of State for Education. The NASUWT continues to alert teachers, through evidence to the Review Body, that this aspiration is not being met.

6.25 The NASUWT’s evidence to previous Review Body reports confirms the disconnection in the system between the performance management process and performance-related pay progression. The DfE’s pay advice to schools is clear that performance management should be an objective and focused process:

‘\textit{Schools should consider carefully the need for targets and objectives that enable teachers to demonstrate performance, rather than simply results. It would not be appropriate for schools to introduce evidence requirements that}

\textsuperscript{63} School Teachers’ Review Body’s 27th Report, Paragraph 5.27.
are not directly and explicitly related to the formal appraisal process and with the objectives and standards that have been agreed with the teacher.'

6.26 The DfE’s pay advice also makes clear that there should be no surprises in the performance-pay process for teachers:

‘The relevant body should manage the appraisal and pay determination process so that there are no surprises at the end of the appraisal cycle – throughout the appraisal cycle both the teacher and appraiser should understand what objectives are in place, the evidence that will be used to assess performance against objectives and the criteria for a successful performance review. Normally, objective setting should be part of an agreed process between the appraiser and the appraisee. Where interim performance management reviews take place, the teacher should be made aware of progress towards meeting their objectives, based on the evidence agreed at the outset of the appraisal cycle.’

6.27 The NASUWT’s survey exposes the failure of schools to implement this advice. Indeed, they have no incentive to do so as it is non-statutory. The following data relates to objectives set during the 2020/21 school year and pay decisions taken about teachers’ performance in the Autumn term of the 2020/21 school year:
- out of teachers who expected to receive pay progression in 2021/22 because of their performance in 2020/21, only 72% did so;
- only 65% of teachers indicated that their school had taken into account the coronavirus pandemic when assessing whether or not they had met their objectives.

6.28 As well as being unfair to teachers in respect of the coronavirus pandemic, the performance-pay system is a process where the outcome is a surprise to 28% of teachers.

6.29 The DfE’s advice about objective setting is quite clear that appraisal objectives should enable teachers to demonstrate performance rather than, simply, results. However, for the majority of teachers, appraisal has become little more than a process by which teachers are held to account against raw pupil data.

6.30 A prerequisite for success in the appraisal and pay progression process is clarity over the success criteria for pay progression. The success criteria for appraisal and pay progression should be included in pay and appraisal policies. Moreover, the duty to make available to teachers a document setting out the appraisal process is set out in the Appraisal Regulations 2012. The overwhelming majority of academy trusts, even those which do not employ teachers in accordance with national pay and conditions, have adopted the Appraisal Regulations 2012.

6.31 The NASUWT’s January/February 2022 pay survey indicates the widespread failure of schools to comply with this basic duty in the Appraisal Regulations:

64 DfE, Implementing your school’s approach to pay, September 2015, page 15.
only 29% of teachers have been given a copy of their pay policy in the last 12 months; and
only 58% of teachers have been given a copy of their school’s appraisal policy in the last 12 months.

6.32 Unsurprisingly, only 54% of eligible teachers received pay progression in 2019/20, falling to 50% of eligible black and minority ethnic (BME) teachers and 40% of eligible disabled teachers.

6.33 The DfE’s own research, *Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform*, indicates that only half of all teachers (52%) have received adequate training on their school’s pay and performance management system.67

6.34 The Review Body must accept that, given that schools cannot meet the most basic duty set out in the Appraisal Regulations to provide information to teachers about success criteria within the appraisal process, they are capable of applying the significant discretions they have over teachers’ pay.

6.35 The NASUWT is calling on the Review Body to recommend an ending of the link between teachers’ and school leaders’ pay progression and the outcomes of the performance management process. Performance-related pay for teachers and school leaders has failed to create a pay framework which rewards and motivates teachers. In addition to the NASUWT’s research, a deep and compelling body of evidence exists about the harmful nature of the link between performance management and pay progression. The NASUWT has identified the key reasons why the link between performance management and pay progression must be broken if teachers in England are to have an appropriate pay framework, as well as a developmental performance management process, which supports teaching and learning.

**Performance-related pay fails to reflect the broad nature of teachers’ and school leaders’ responsibilities**

6.36 Teaching and leading teaching and learning is a complex and multi-faceted professional activity. In order to support the progress and development of children and young people, teachers have to develop, bring to bear and combine a wide range of skills, knowledge and understanding. Systems that link pay progression to performance management will encourage a disproportionate focus on the limited range of outcomes identified in appraisal processes. As a result, such systems encourage employers to place disproportionate emphasis on achievement of these outcomes rather than the full scope of teachers’ and school leaders’ responsibilities and duties.

**Performance-related pay is often time-consuming and bureaucratic for all participants**

6.37 Because the stakes associated with the outcomes of performance management processes that are linked to pay progression are so high, a clear incentive is generated on employers and those subject to performance to collect excessive quantities and forms of evidence to determine whether or not these outcomes have been achieved. In particular, the unreasonable denial of pay progression can create legal liabilities for employers, including

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those derived from equal pay legislation, and create incentives to establish highly burdensome evidence collection arrangements in case pay outcomes are challenged. Such activities fail to ensure that teachers and school leaders can concentrate on their core responsibilities for teaching and leading and learning, and that their employer can support them in doing so. They also add to teacher and school leader workload, the aspect of their working lives about which they continue to express the most concern.

**Performance-related pay undermines the collegiality of the teaching profession**

6.38 While teachers and school leaders have significant individual responsibilities, they also work in a context where these responsibilities can only be discharged to the greatest possible extent when they are undertaken collaboratively with other colleagues. Teachers and school leaders work together to create holistic learning environments, in which the work of one colleague is augmented by that of others. Teachers and school leaders develop their personal effectiveness by sharing expertise and experience and providing critical professional support to each other. The collegiate environment required for such ways of working is undermined by the excessive focus on individual performance in pay progression systems that are linked to the outcomes of appraisal. As is often the case, when the ability to access pay progression is more dependent on the resources available to support it, rather than an objective assessment of the achievement of objectives, a culture is created where the pay progression of one teacher and school leader is obtained at the expense of another. Partnership working and the levels of trust necessary to support it can only be undermined in such circumstances.

**Performance-related pay discourages professional innovation and creativity**

6.39 Teaching and leading teaching and learning effectively requires teachers and school leaders to be given scope to take appropriate risks, explore possibilities and act creatively, particularly in the face of novel or exceptional challenges. For example, the development and implementation of remote and blended learning offered during the first phases of the pandemic at great pace, and with little or no prior experience on which to draw, was only possible in large part due to teachers and school leaders experimenting and trialling different approaches, which were adapted and refined in the light of experience.

6.40 The high stakes associated with performance management systems linked to pay progression militate against informed risk-taking and experimentation. The negative consequences of the occasional failures that are inherent in innovative professional practices for teachers’ and school leaders’ remuneration create incentives to adhere to established and accepted practices, rather than attempt new and potentially better approaches to teaching and learning.

6.41 It is worth noting in this context that in a wide range of other occupational sectors, systems of reward in which pay increases or progression are linked to the outcomes of appraisal processes are being increasingly abandoned due to the demonstrably adverse impact they have on productivity, creativity and innovation.
Performance-related pay reduces the focus of appraisals on enhancing professional practice

6.42 In systems where the outcomes of performance management are linked to pay progression, an incentive is created for teachers and school leaders, subject to appraisal, to shift the focus of consideration away from those areas of their practice that they would wish to develop. Identifying professional training and development needs is a core purpose of appraisal.

6.43 In order for these needs to be identified and addressed, an environment of trust must be established in which teachers and school leaders can reflect meaningfully on their professional practice and draw attention to any skills or professional knowledge and understanding that they consider would benefit from further enhancement. If the outcomes of such discussions could have adverse implications for pay progression, teachers and school leaders have less of an incentive to confirm that some areas of their practice are more effective than others to those responsible for their appraisal.

Performance-related pay undermines fairness and consistency over pay progression decisions

6.44 Employers often establish organisation-wide criteria for the conduct of performance management in order to seek to ensure that no teacher or school leader is subject to more demanding or less achievable performance management objectives than their peers. However, it remains the case that complete consistency in the identification of appraisal objectives and evaluation of the extent to which they have been met is likely to vary significantly, leading to teachers and school leaders having different opportunities to access pay progression.

6.45 Such differences work to undermine confidence in the fairness of employers’ pay and rewards systems and the levels of trust that all staff are being treated equitably in respect of their pay that is necessary to secure the highest possible levels of organisational morale and motivation. They also fail to reflect the fact that the professional motivation of teachers is driven by their intrinsic commitment to the public service ethos, through which they are focused on the educational outcomes of children and young people. In such a context, attempts to secure the motivation of teachers and school leaders through linking pay progression to the achievement of narrowly focused appraisal outcomes is not only redundant, but also counter-productive.

Performance-related pay is an unnecessary and ineffective means of holding teachers to account

6.46 It is sometimes claimed that linking pay progression to the outcomes of performance management is necessary in order to hold teachers and school leaders to account for their professional activities. However, this view fails to recognise that teachers are held to account through a wide range of established processes, including the performance management process itself, as well as disciplinary, capability and regulatory processes that are designed explicitly for this purpose.
Implementing automatic incremental progression gives teachers greater certainty over their future pay levels and aids teacher retention

6.47 As the NASUWT has observed earlier in this evidence submission, the Review Body has identified that the most important challenge for schools and academy trusts is to retain teachers in the profession.

6.48 The Review Body clearly states in its 31st Report (published in July 2020): ‘Our consideration of the long-term trends confirms that there are severe and persistent problems with teacher supply.’ The Review Body goes on to comment:

‘While the deterioration in retention rates is most marked for teachers early in their career, we are concerned that there are also indications of a growing challenge in retaining experienced classroom teachers and those in leadership roles.’

6.49 The Review Body further states: ‘In the longer term, it is important that the pay framework provides earnings for experienced teachers that are not out of step with the earnings of those with similar experience in other graduate professions.’ The Review Body further recognises that experienced teachers are influential mentors and role models for teachers starting in the profession and that the treatment of experienced teachers impacts on the retention of teachers in the early years of their careers.

6.50 One of the most damaging impacts of performance-related pay is that it denies many teachers certainty over their pay levels during their employment in a school or academy trust. Implementing automatic incremental progression will provide that certainty to teachers, which will become a key attraction in working for an employer which follows this pay progression arrangement.

Performance-related pay is costly to administer and takes school leaders away from activities which are more valuable for them and also for their schools

6.51 In many instances, administering a performance-related pay system is more costly than the amount of money which is ‘saved’ from the teachers’ pay bill by withholding pay progression from those teachers who are not awarded a performance-related pay increase. This is because of the significant management resources which are devoted to administering a performance-related pay system, in terms of school leaders’ time, the cost of administering a pay appeals process and the cost of obtaining legal advice to justify the withholding of pay progression from teachers.

6.52 Academy trusts which have moved away from performance-related pay have accrued real benefits in freeing up their school leaders to lead teaching and learning and develop classroom teacher expertise. E-ACT, which is one of the largest national MATs, outlines the benefits as follows:

‘Last year, the decision to remove performance-related pay was a landmark moment. By removing pay from our appraisal and coaching conversations, we want the resulting transparent and honest discussions to help all staff celebrate what they do well and feel able to ask for help to improve. We are pleased with the positive feedback we have received from staff so far and we
will continue to devise training and coaching sessions with everyone next year as part of our People Development Plan.’

Performance-related pay is a key driver of discriminatory outcomes for teachers

6.53 There is a growing body of evidence that performance-related pay is a source of discriminatory pay outcomes, particularly on grounds of pregnancy/maternity, disability and race. These are all protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 and any unlawful discrimination against teachers in these categories makes schools and academy trusts vulnerable to legal action. The DfE has commissioned research into the implications of all schools having a clear legal Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), under the Equality Act 2010, to:

- eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other conduct that is prohibited under the Equality Act 2010;
- advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it; and
- foster good relations across all protected characteristics, between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it.

6.54 One of the most significant ways that schools and academy trusts can meet these duties in respect of teachers’ pay is to eliminate performance-related pay from their pay policies and pay processes.

The impact of pay freedoms and flexibilities

The teachers’ pay framework – embedding inequality

6.55 The NASUWT presented detailed evidence to the Review Body for its 27th Report as to why schools are not best placed to decide how pay awards should be targeted to meet their specific recruitment and retention needs. The NASUWT also drew attention to the advice from the OME on the use of discretions to target pay awards:

‘In considering all options, PRBs [pay review bodies] and departments will need to be mindful of any indirect disproportionate effects on sections of the workforce according to protected characteristics: the impact of proposals on the workforce population will need to be assessed.’

6.56 The NASUWT has previously highlighted the woeful failure of the DfE to equality assess the 2013 and 2014 pay reforms prior to their introduction and to assess the impact of those pay reforms in practice through monitoring schools and academy trusts’ pay progression decisions.

6.57 In its 27th Report, the Review Body states:

‘While we have received only limited evidence so far to suggest that the pay system is being applied in a discriminatory manner, we nevertheless consider this to be a matter of concern it is not clear that adequate system-wide mechanisms are in place to monitor decisions and to provide assurance that discriminatory practice is not occurring in some schools. The

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Department should work with local authorities and school governing bodies to monitor the application of local pay policies to ensure that they do not result in discriminatory outcomes.  

6.58 The DfE did publish some research into the equalities impact of its pay reforms in connection with the Review Body’s 28th remit. In October 2017, the DfE published Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform, which purported to research the 2013 and 2014 reforms to the teachers’ pay framework. This research had very serious limitations.

6.59 The researchers missed the ground-breaking research carried out by the University of Warwick Institute for Employment Research, commissioned by the NASUWT into teachers’ pay, including the 2013 and 2014 teachers’ pay reforms.

6.60 Unsurprisingly, Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform concluded that there are questions which deserve further exploration about the equality impact of the Government’s pay reforms. The Final Report concluded that more in-depth research, which would take account of the distribution of teachers across regions and school types, would be required to establish that teachers’ pay reforms have not had a discriminatory impact.

6.61 The Review Body quoted the conclusion of the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) Report in its 28th and 29th Reports, highlighting that further research was necessary, stating the following in its 28th Report:

‘We are very concerned about… continued reports from consultants that the application of this system in schools is leading to discriminatory outcomes. It is important that there is a clear evidence base about the equalities implications of the pay system to determine whether any mitigating action is required. While the Department’s recent evaluation did conclude that there was no evidence that groups with protected characteristics were disadvantaged, it stated that “more in-depth research would be needed to conclusively state if this was the case.” And we note that this evaluation did identify some disparities in relation to the pay increases received by teachers of different ethnic groups that the authors recommended should be explored in more detail. The Department should follow up on its previous pay evaluation with further research that focuses on the equality implications of the teachers’ pay system.’

6.62 Again, the Review Body draws attention to its concerns about the DfE’s continued failure to commission additional research on its equalities reforms in its 29th Report:

‘Our 28th report (July 2018) made the observation that the Department should “follow up on its previous pay evaluation with further research that focuses on the equality implications of the teachers’ pay system.” We note that, to date, the Department has not published any further research that

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71 https://www.nasuwt.org.uk/advice/pay-pensions/pay-progression.html
follows up on the 2017 evaluation of the pay system. As we noted last year, this evaluation itself stated that more research was required to conclusively state whether any group of teachers with protected characteristics were being disadvantaged by the pay system. We therefore restate our observation that further research should be conducted by the Department that focuses on the equality implications of the teachers’ pay system.’

6.63 Again, in its 30th Report, the Review Body repeats the recommendation that the DfE should carry out further research into the equalities implications of its pay reforms:

‘We note that the Department published in 2017 an evaluation of the 2013 reforms to the teacher pay system. While this evaluation found no evidence that groups with protected characteristics were disadvantaged, it reported that further research was required to conclusively state if this was the case.

‘We stated in our 28th and 29th reports (July 2018 and July 2019 respectively), in the context of this finding, that further research should be conducted by the Department that focuses on the equality implications of the teacher pay system. The Department has, to date, not undertaken further research to examine these matters.

‘The Department should robustly monitor the equalities implications of the teacher pay system as a whole. This should include undertaking further research to ensure that there is clear and comprehensive evidence on these important issues.’

6.64 The Review Body should be aware that the DfE has continued to fail to take any action to work with local authorities to assess the equalities implications of its 2013/14 pay reforms, or to undertake further research which focuses on the equalities implications of the teachers’ pay system. This is yet another example of the failure of the Government to respect the findings of the Review Body and its own data.

6.65 Compelling evidence is set out in the Government’s Race Disparity Audit, published by the Cabinet Office in October 2017.

6.66 The Race Disparity Audit draws the following conclusion:

‘Asian and Black households and those in the other ethnic group were more likely to be poor and were the most likely to be in persistent poverty. Around 1 in 4 children in households headed by people from an Asian background or those in the Other ethnic group were in persistent poverty, as were 1 in 5 children in Black households and 1 in 10 White British households. Households of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black, Mixed and Other backgrounds were more likely to receive income-related benefits and tax credits than those in other ethnic groups. The ethnic minority population is more likely to

73 STRB’s 30th Report, paragraph 6.10, Pages 94-95.
74 Race Disparity Audit, Summary Findings from the Ethnicity Facts and Figures Website, Cabinet Office, October 2017.
live in areas of deprivation, especially Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi people."  

6.67 The Cabinet Office Report highlights a particular feature of BME employment on which the Review Body will wish to focus, which is that: ‘the public sector workforce is a major employer, but ethnic minority employees are concentrated in the lower grades or ranks, and among younger employees.’

6.68 In these circumstances, the DfE’s failings are particularly unacceptable.

Women teachers’ pay

6.69 The recent history of women teachers’ pay is illustrative of the discriminatory impact of the 2013 and 2014 reforms to teachers’ and school leaders’ pay. Women are the only group with protected characteristics which has suffered as a result of the 2013 and 2014 reforms. However, because of the hundreds of thousands of women teachers included in the SWC and the fact that schools generally report the gender of all their teachers, whereas data on teachers in other equality groups is not as comprehensively reported, the NASUWT is presenting this to the Review Body as a key data analysis for consideration.

6.70 The NASUWT draws to the attention of the Review Body continuing gender pay inequality.

6.71 In public discourse, the gender pay gap is often used to refer to pay disparities which occur within businesses or employment sectors and which arise from the extent to which men tend to have higher-paid roles than women. This is certainly the case in the teaching profession and is a key factor in the pay disparities between women and men. However, there is also evidence in the teaching profession of pay inequalities when women and men carry out the same teaching role, which is indicative of sex discrimination in the operation of the pay system.

6.72 The DfE’s commissioned pay research, Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform, concludes the following about school leaders’ pay between 2010 and 2015:

‘Considering the pay for leaders with particular characteristics, male leaders have higher average pay than female leaders by around £5,500, across the period.’

6.73 This pay disparity has not arisen solely because of disparities between the sectors. It also applies in the primary phase. As the DfE’s research indicates:

‘The average base pay for male headteachers in primary schools in 2015 is higher than female headteachers in primary schools by around £1,800’.

6.74 The DfE stubbornly refuses to commission research for which the Review Body has asked into the equality impact of its 2013 and 2014 pay reforms.

75 Ibid, paragraph 2.9.
76 Ibid, paragraph 2.25.
77 DfE, Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform, Technical Appendix, paragraph 3.1.3.3.
78 Ibid.
However, the data which the DfE does collect indicates how the gender pay gap has grown over the last three years. The most recently published SWC data is from 2020.

6.75 The headline gender pay gap data from the 2018 SWC indicates that:
- the average woman classroom teacher’s salary is £36,020;
- the average male classroom teacher’s salary is £36,884;
- **the male classroom teacher’s pay premium is £864**;
- the average female school leader’s salary is £57,172;
- the average male school leader’s salary is £62,657;
- **the male school leader’s pay premium is £5,485**;
- the average female headteacher’s salary is £67,364;
- the average male headteacher’s salary is £75,492;
- **the male headteacher’s pay premium is £8,129**.

6.76 The 2019 SWC shows that average salaries are higher for **male** teachers across all grades:79
- For male classroom teachers, the average salary was £37,885 compared to £36,985 for female.
- **The male classroom teachers’ pay premium is £900, an increase over 12 months.**
- For headteachers, the average salary for males was £77,362 compared to £68,870 for females.
- **The male headteacher’s pay premium is £8,492, an increase over 12 months.**

6.77 The 2020 SWC data for England80 shows that average salaries are higher for male teachers than female teachers across all grades:
- For male classroom teachers, the average salary was £39,147 compared to £38,223 for female classroom teachers.
- **The male classroom teacher’s pay premium is £924 in 2020, which represents a widening of the gender pay gap over the past 12 months, from £900 in 2019.**
- For headteachers in 2020, the average salary for men was £79,217 compared to £70,709 for women.
- The gender pay gap for headteachers is £8,508, which represents a widening of the gender pay gap over the past 12 months, from £8,492 in 2019.

**Restoration of pay portability**

6.78 In addition to its discriminatory impact, the removal of pay portability deters teachers from moving schools and hampers career progression.

6.79 The NASUWT has successfully negotiated pay policies with many schools, local authorities and academy trusts that have maintained teachers’ entitlements to pay portability. However, without the wholesale adoption of this, it cannot be as beneficial as a statutory entitlement to portability across the whole teaching profession.

6.80 In its 2nd Report, the Independent Welsh Pay Review Body (IWPRB) recommended the restoration of pay portability to the Welsh teachers’ pay and conditions framework from September 2021 onwards. This was accepted by the Minister of Education, who included the precise definition of pay portability in the IWPRB’s 3rd remit, with a view to implementing this in the 2021 STPC(W)D.

6.81 As with annual time-served pay progression, teachers in Wales enjoy entitlements which remove discrimination from their pay framework which teachers in England do not enjoy. Unless this is rectified, this will exacerbate the teacher shortage crisis in England.

6.82 The NASUWT requests accordingly that the Review Body recommends the restoration of the pay portability provisions which were removed from the STPCD.

Workload and planning, preparation and assessment (PPA) time

“For the amount of hours we are officially paid for, compared to the amount of hours we actually work (including during weekends and holidays), teachers’ pay is ludicrous. In no other profession would you be expected to work so many unpaid hours because ‘it is just part of the job’. ” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

6.83 The Review Body has a crucial task before it: to ensure that teachers are remunerated appropriately and fairly for their work. The NASUWT asks the Review Body to recognise that teachers are working longer and harder for less in real terms.

6.84 Even before the coronavirus pandemic, teachers’ workload had spiralled to unmanageable levels and there was widespread failure by schools to provide a work-life balance to teachers and school leaders. The Government has already quantified teachers’ working hours in excess of 55 hours per week. Effectively, teachers are providing hours of unpaid overtime every week to their schools.

6.85 Moreover, the increase in workload from which teachers have suffered has led to the current PPA provision in the STPCD of not less than 10% of the teacher’s timetabled teaching time becoming wholly inadequate to mitigate teachers’ workload pressures.81 Ten per cent of timetabled teaching time was always intended to be a minimum level, rather than a maximum, and it needs to be increased.

6.86 The NASUWT regrets that the Review Body has not been provided with a remit to consider this vital issue and calls on the Review Body to demand this.

81 Ibid, paragraph 52.5.
7. **MATTERS FOR RECOMMENDATION**

“I think the pay freeze over the last ten years has been detrimental to teachers’ pay and conditions. Teachers work long hours and have continued to go above and beyond during COVID, and there is very little recognition of this fact. Freezing pay has had a huge impact on the quality of life for my family and we have had to make huge cutbacks. When we work so hard and for such long hours, pay should not be reduced. There is no respect for the teaching profession. A teacher’s salary could no longer support a family in today’s climate and I would not be encouraging anyone to become a teacher. If I could find a job in another industry on the same salary I would leave teaching straightaway. The Government demonstrates to the country that they have no respect for teachers with the constant pay freezes. Take the cuts from people who can actually afford it!” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

7.1 The Secretary of State states in his remit letter:

‘We need to achieve a significant uplift to starting salaries of classroom teachers to ensure teaching is a competitive and attractive graduate option, alongside creating an early career pay offer that better reflects the challenges experienced in those first few years. To achieve this, the Government remains committed to increasing starting salaries to £30,000 outside of the London pay areas. My written evidence will set out – based on the latest evidence and data – a strong case for delivering this commitment, and that this should be achieved alongside significant, but sustainable, uplifts to the pay of more experienced teachers, but still with the aim of moving towards a relatively flatter pay progression structure.’

7.2 The NASUWT will respond to this statement about Government policy in this section of the STRB Evidence and comments as follows:

**A significant uplift to starting salaries of classroom teachers**

“I am currently off work with COVID but still working around the clock on home learning and planning. I do not feel that my pay reflects my experience or the hours I work, and it does not match rises in inflation, yet I feel that it will be a battle to keep my job until I retire because of age and budgets. I’m currently 42 and should not have this constant worry.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

7.3 The NASUWT’s analysis shows that the pay of teachers and school leaders under the STPCD has fallen by between 15.1% and 22.9% since 2010. As a result of differential pay awards from 2015 onwards, experienced teachers have suffered greater cuts in real terms pay than teachers who are newer to the profession. The pay of UPR teachers has fallen by 21.1% in real terms and the pay of teachers on M6 (the maximum of the MPR) has fallen by 17.0%. Yet the DfE’s data confirms that two thirds of teachers are paid on M6 or on the UPR.

7.4 The NASUWT’s modelling shows that salary increases of between 19.25% and 25.47% are necessary to restore classroom teachers’ salaries to their 2010 levels. Given that the Review Body has a remit for a teachers pay award
in 2023 and 2024, the NASUWT would accept that the restoration of teachers’ pay can occur over two years, but the Union does make it clear that the restoration of pay levels to 2010 levels by 2024 is a minimum necessity to end the teacher shortage crisis.

7.5 The NASUWT does not turn its face against a significant uplift to the starting salaries of classroom teachers but this must not be at the expense of the overwhelming majority of the teaching profession. The NASUWT calls on the Review Body to recommend that the whole of the teaching profession, all teachers and school leaders, must receive a significant salary uplift, amounting to restoration of pay to 2010 levels.

7.6 In its January/February 2022 pay survey, the NASUWT asked teachers to identify whether they agreed with the following policy priorities:
- teachers’ starting salaries should rise to £30k;
- all teachers should receive the same percentage pay rise, irrespective of experience or length of service;
- the pay rise should prioritise experienced teachers.

7.7 The responses from members showed a very clear set of priorities:
- 28% of respondents believe that a priority is that teachers’ starting salaries should rise to at least £30k;
- 80% believe that all teachers should receive the same percentage pay rise, irrespective of experience or length of service;
- 33% believe that the pay rise should prioritise experienced teachers.

7.8 The overwhelming desire is for the same percentage pay rise for all teachers.

7.9 The NASUWT therefore calls on the Review Body to recommend the following pay awards as part of a sustained programme of teachers’ pay restoration:
- September 2022 – 12%;
- September 2023 – 10%;
- September 2024 – 8%.

“I do believe experienced teachers should have a pay bracket leading up to at least 45-47k. This would entice me to stay longer in the profession as opposed to considering alternative options/retraining in other professions where pay is lucrative.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

7.10 There are three additional matters on which we would ask the Review Body to make recommendations in its Report.

a) **A single pay scale for classroom teachers**

7.11 The current classroom teacher pay framework of a main pay scale and an upper pay scale was developed two decades ago.

7.12 The changes introduced at that time were intended to facilitate access to higher pay levels for teachers who remain in the classroom. The essential aspect of a successful teachers’ pay system is that it should be one which rewards, motivates and encourages classroom teachers. This is particularly crucial in terms of raising standards, given the centrality of classroom teachers to the provision of high-quality education.
7.13 In 2000, the teachers’ pay system was transformed through Social Partnership between the Government, employers and trade unions. The introduction of performance management and the performance threshold to the upper pay spine in 2000 led to major changes in the pay structure. A new national pay scale, shortened to nine scale points, was introduced for classroom teachers. This was to enable swifter salary progression for teachers, including the provision for teachers at salary point nine to apply to cross to the performance-pay threshold, unlocking access to higher salaries for teachers who remained committed to teaching in the classroom.

7.14 The teachers’ main scale was later shortened to six points, enabling teachers to reach the top more quickly, providing access to higher pay levels and making teaching more attractive and stemming the loss of teachers after three years because of uncompetitive salaries. Reforms to teachers’ pay implemented by the Government from 1997 to 2010 contributed to a sustained period of pay growth for teachers, as illustrated below. Significant above-inflation increases in teachers’ pay were only ended by the implementation of public sector pay austerity by the Government from 2010 onwards.

7.15 However, over the last decade, the extended employer freedoms and flexibilities have impacted on access to, and the expectations placed by schools on, the upper pay scale and on the progression of teachers from the main pay scale to the upper pay scale. Earlier in this evidence submission, the NASUWT outlined the low pay progression rates from M6 to the upper pay range.

7.16 The NASUWT asks the Review Body to accept that the shorter classroom teachers’ pay scales in Wales and Scotland, accompanied by automatic incremental pay progression, will make teaching elsewhere in the UK increasingly attractive compared with teaching in England.

7.17 In this submission, the NASUWT has put forward detailed evidence to demonstrate that, in addition to the low levels of pay progression across the whole profession, pay progression rates are not spread equally, with disparities by gender, race and disability. The gender pay gap in teaching is partially driven by differences in pay progression rates across the primary and secondary phases. Where employer discretion and flexibility exists, it tends to result in discriminatory effects. Alongside the restoration of 2010 teachers’ pay levels, a single classroom teacher pay scale, with automatic annual
progression up it, is the minimum reform necessary to restore competitiveness and fair reward to the teachers’ pay framework.

b) **Shorten the length of the classroom teachers’ pay scale**

7.18 The shortest classroom teacher pay scale in the UK jurisdictions is the Scottish scale, which has six pay points (including the probationer’s pay point). The two classroom teacher pay ranges/scales in England, Wales and Northern Ireland combined have nine pay points (England and Northern Ireland) and eight pay points (Wales). The national advisory pay points in the England STPCD create combined national advisory pay scales that comprise of nine pay points. However, some employers in England have classroom teacher pay scales with significantly more pay points than these and additional requirements governing the eligibility of teachers for pay progression.

7.19 The NASUWT welcomed the Review Body’s recommendation of the inclusion of national advisory pay points for the main and upper pay ranges in the STPCD in its 30th Report, and the inclusion of unqualified teacher scale national advisory pay points in the STPCD its 31st Report. The national advisory pay scales in the STPCD reflect the pay reference points published by the teacher unions and the Local Government Association (LGA) since 2013, which were adopted by the majority of local authorities and employers.

7.20 The national advisory pay points have been highly popular with local authorities and employers since 2020 and the reports received by the NASUWT have indicated that, over the last two years, those employers which were not following the unions’/LGA pay scales have adopted the national advisory pay scales in the STPCD. The unions have adopted the national advisory pay points as their pay scales and recommended these to employers, alongside the LGA.

7.21 However, there is still a small minority of employers which follow far longer pay scales with a multiplicity of pay points, which detract from a national pay structure for teachers which promotes career development and retention in the profession.

7.22 The NASUWT asks the Review Body to accept that, given the success of the national advisory pay points with employers and with unions, it is now time to return to mandatory pay scales in the STPCD for all teacher and school leader pay ranges.

7.23 There is now a desperate need for reform of the classroom teacher pay scales in England, and the NASUWT believes that the experiences of Scotland and Wales point the way forward for the Review Body.

7.24 The Scottish and Welsh Governments have recently reformed their teachers’ pay frameworks to shorten the classroom teachers’ pay scales and enable teachers to progress more quickly to the highest teacher pay levels. This aids both recruitment and retention, both of which, of course, are supported by the time-served annual pay progression arrangements in both Scotland and Wales.
Scotland

7.25 On 1 April 2019, the Scottish Government shortened the classroom teachers’ pay scale from six pay points to five pay points, albeit that a probationer’s pay point (point zero) continued to exist.

7.26 Previous pay points 1 and 2 were combined to create new pay point 1 and the maximum of the new five-point classroom teachers’ pay scale reached £41,412 by 1 April 2020.\(^2\) A pay award in Scotland is pending, which will uplift this further.

Wales

7.27 In September 2020, the Welsh Government established a main pay scale of five points. From 2013 to 2020, as part of the England and Wales teachers’ pay framework, Wales had a main pay range from 2013 to 2020, when the IWPRB and the Welsh Government acted to re-establish pay scales. Before 2020, the Welsh LGA had established a seven-point main pay scale, which was generally followed by Welsh local authorities. In 2020, this was replaced by a five-point pay scale, which was uplifted by 1.75% in 2021. As in Scotland, previous pay points 1 and 2 were combined to create a new pay point 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory scales as provided by LAs in Wales</th>
<th>2019 £</th>
<th>2020 Scale Point</th>
<th>2020 £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>24,906</td>
<td>M1 (min)</td>
<td>27,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>26,041</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>27,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>28,133</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>29,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>30,299</td>
<td>M4</td>
<td>31,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>32,686</td>
<td>M5</td>
<td>33,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6a</td>
<td>35,269</td>
<td>M6 (max)</td>
<td>37,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6b</td>
<td>35,971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.28 The NASUWT advocates the same approach to shortening the classroom teacher pay scale as in Scotland and Wales – combining the lower pay points to create a new point at the highest pay point level.

7.29 The NASUWT advocates the adoption of a six-point classroom teacher pay scale to replace the current main and upper pay ranges with a threshold between them. The maximum of the new six-point classroom teacher pay scale should be set at the current maximum of the upper pay range plus the relevant pay award sum (either the 2022 or the 2023 pay award). The minimum of the new six-point classroom teacher pay scale should be £30,000 (either the 2022 or the 2023 pay award).

\(^2\) [https://www.nasuwt.org.uk/advice/pay-pensions/pay-scales/scotland-pay-scales.html#Main%20Grade%20Scale](https://www.nasuwt.org.uk/advice/pay-pensions/pay-scales/scotland-pay-scales.html#Main%20Grade%20Scale)
7.30 An assimilation process would need to take place to assimilate teachers onto a new six-point teacher spine. The NASUWT advocates that assimilation should be on a ‘no detriment’ basis and that teachers should be assimilated onto a new pay point which is no longer than their current pay point after the relevant pay award has been applied (either the 2022 or the 2023 pay award).

c) **Ensure coherence in the gaps between pay points on the classroom teachers’ pay scale**

7.31 In England and Wales, a previously coherent pay scale structure, where there was a clear rationale for gaps between pay points, has been removed by differential pay increases over the last five years; in particular, higher pay awards for teachers paid on the MPR. In particular, the differential between M6 and UPR1 has been reduced to £1,729 – it was £2,001 in 2000.

7.32 The NASUWT asks the Review Body to establish generally even gaps between pay points on the single-classroom six-point teacher pay scale.
8. CONCLUSION

8.1 The NASUWT makes no apologies for asking the Review Body to implement significant structural reform of the teachers’ pay framework. However, the Union believes that the nature of this remit from the Secretary of State, and the nature of the crisis in the teaching profession, necessitates radical reform.

8.2 A substantial multi-year pay award for all teachers and school leaders is the key to radical reform. The NASUWT stresses again to the Review Body that it should recommend a pay award and a teachers’ pay framework which the teaching profession and the education system deserve, and educational and social recovery both warrant and need.

“More than a decade of pay freezes and below-inflation pay rises means we are now miles behind where we should be. We should see a really significant single pay rise and then guaranteed pay rises that keep track of real inflation. I am tired that public sector workers, and teachers in particular, carry the can for the country’s poor finances. I suggest all public sector pay rises should match MP pay rises. If they need them, then so do we.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.

“It is nothing short of a disgrace that those who got us through a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic are being treated with contempt, whilst those who mishandled it have managed to reward themselves constantly.” – Teacher, NASUWT England pay survey, 2022.
9. ANNEXES

1. Incomes Data Research – *A review of school teachers’ pay in England compared with other graduate professions*, February 2022.